The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether Conway’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the search of a suitcase in the possession of a codefendant, and the seizure of cocaine found in it, so as to give Conway standing to move to suppress the cocaine as evidence.

On March 1, 1978, law enforcement officers in San Francisco were notified by officers in Miami, Florida, that Conway and one Mazzelli were suspected of smuggling drugs and could be expected to arrive in San Francisco on a particular flight. On their arrival, they gave the appearance of traveling separately. Officers approached them separately, and detained and questioned them separately. Mazzelli was ar *1158 rested on outstanding traffic warrants. His suitcase was searched and cocaine was discovered. Conway was then arrested.

In due course, Mazzelli was indicted on charges of possession and conspiracy, and Conway was indicted for conspiracy. Mazzelli moved to suppress the cocaine as the fruit of an unlawful search. Conway joined in the motion. After a hearing, the motion was granted as to both defendants. The government appeals. The appeal as to Mazzelli has been dropped, as the government now concedes that the search was unlawful. The appeal is pressed as to Conway upon the sole ground that Conway lacked standing to move to suppress, in that no Fourth Amendment right of his was violated by the search of Mazzelli’s suitcase.

The grounds on which Conway asserts standing came to light in the course of hearings on the defendants’ motions, including that of Mazzelli to suppress the evidence. The greater part of the hearings was taken up with argument and testimony in support of the government’s position that the search was a lawful inventory search. Only after it became apparent that the court was convinced to the contrary did the question arise whether Conway’s Fourth Amendment rights, as well as those of Mazzelli, were violated.

Conway asserted standing on two grounds. First, he filed an affidavit in which he stated:

Mr. Swenson, counsel for the government, questioned this statement, saying that “Now [Conway] has filed a belated affidavit stating that he bought that suitcase. [Thus] he has alleged a possessory interest. I would request, however, that the court would require him to make — to put on the record how and under what circumstances he bought that.” The district judge responded, “No, I’m not going to do any such thing.”

Second, Conway claimed a possessory interest in the cocaine that was seized. It would appear that government counsel, given the government’s theory of the case, could not avoid conceding that Conway indeed did have a connection with the cocaine amounting to a possessory interest:

On appeal, the government asserts that the court erroneously granted Conway’s motion to suppress on the ground of *1159 automatic standing under Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). The court’s reasoning is not clear; and no findings were made. If the court was in fact relying on automatic standing, this was error. Automatic standing is available only to one charged with a crime of which possession is an essential element, and conspiracy is not such a crime. United States v. Prueitt, 540 F.2d 995, 1004 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, sub nom. Temple v. United States, 429 U.S. 1063 , 97 S.Ct. 790 , 50 L.Ed.2d 780 (1977). Moreover, the court may well have been in error in denying the government the right to examine Conway respecting his ownership of the suitcase. Nevertheless, we affirm the judgment below, on the ground that Conway established actual (as distinguished from automatic) standing to contest the search and seizure.

The court in Jones v. United States, supra, states the basis for standing under Rule 41(e) of the Fed.R.Crim.P.: “In order to qualify as a ‘person aggrieved by an unlawful search or seizure’ one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else.” 362 U.S. at 261 , 80 S.Ct. at 731 .

When the purpose of the search is the discovery and seizure of certain property it is against the property and those laying claim to it that the search is directed. If, in pursuit of the property, intrusion has been made upon the privacy of others, those others have also achieved standing. But it would seem plain that the principal grievant is the victim of the seizure that was the very purpose of the search. 1

The court in Jones recognizes both bases for standing in what it terms “the conventional standing requirement,” 362 U.S. at 262 , 80 S.Ct. 725 : “that the movant claim either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched.” Id. at 261, 80 S.Ct. at 731 . The court ruled that the defendant had standing in both respects — through an interest in the seized property and a sufficient interest in the premises searched. It was in connection with the former holding that the concept of what has come to be called “automatic standing” was announced. This concept is itself founded on the proposition that a possessory interest in that which was seized confers standing to challenge the seizure. 2 This same proposition has been recognized in later cases dealing with the concept of automatic standing. 3

The Supreme Court’s latest discussion of standing to suppress the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure is found in Rakas v. *1160 Illinois, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 421 , 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). That case reexamined the second portion of Jones dealing with standing based on an interest in the premises searched and the standards that should apply in such cases. However, in substance it reaffirmed the proposition recognized in Jones that a possessory interest in that which was seized confers standing.

The court first emphasizes the failure of the petitioner to assert a claim of ownership over the items seized-U.S. at-, n.l, 99 S.Ct. 421 . To us this implicitly recognizes that a possessory interest in the evidence seized confers standing to challenge the seizure. This implicit recognition is later explicitly noted. After suggesting that a “casual visitor” should not be able to contest the lawfulness of a search, the Court states: “This is not to say that such visitors could not contest the lawfulness of the seizure of evidence or the search if their own property were seized during the search.” id. at -, 99 S.Ct. at 430 .

As we have noted Conway’s possessory interest in the cocaine was established by stipulation in open court, invited by the government and not disputed. This suffices to confer standing to suppress the seized cocaine.

Judgment affirmed.

. Judge Bonsai in his dissent cites authority that would seem to hold to the contrary. To the extent that it does we must respectfully disagree.

. The dilemma from which the rule provided an escape was “that possession both convicts and confers standing.” 362 U.S. at 263 , 80 S.Ct. at 732 . The court concluded. “In cases where the indictment itself charges possession, the defendant in a very real sense is revealed as a ‘person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure.’ ” id. at 264 , 80 S.Ct. at 733 .

. In Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 , 88 S.Ct. 967 , 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968) a suitcase containing evidence incriminating the defendant was found in the basement of a house belonging to another. On motion to suppress the defendant testified that the suitcase was his. The testimony he gave was later admitted against him during his trial. The Court held that testimony given by a defendant on motion to suppress in order to establish his standing as one aggrieved by the search could not be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt or innocence. The court stated: “[t]he only, or at least the most natural, way in which [the defendant] could found standing to object to the admission of the suitcase was to testify that he was its owner.” 390 U.S. at 391 , 88 S.Ct. at 974 .

In Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228 , 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1569 , 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973) the court stated: “For example, under the Simmons doctrine the defendant is permitted to establish the requisite standing by claiming ‘possession’ of incriminating evidence * * *. Thus, petitioners in this case could have asserted, at the pretrial suppression hearing, a possessory interest in [the evidence seized].”