Marc Keenberg appeals from his conviction on two counts of theft of Government property; Arthur Vissars appeals from his conviction on two counts of aiding and abetting the Keenberg thefts. We affirm.

I. Statement of the Case

Keenberg is operations manager of Ekco Metals (Ekco), a scrap metal company located in Los Angeles, California. Vissars is employed by Ekco as a truck driver.

On July 13, 1977, Keenberg went to the Mare Island Naval Shipyard to inspect several lots of scrap material for the purpose of submitting bids on the lots. The scrap yard at Mare Island had been under surveillance since March, 1977, because of appar *402 ent thefts of scrap metal and misuse of Government property. John Baker had been placed in the scrap metal yard as an undercover agent by the Naval Investigative Service. Baker met Keenberg and escorted him on a tour of the yard. During the tour the two discussed methods of illegally obtaining scrap metal.

Ekco submitted a successful bid for one lot of Mare Island scrap. On August 17, 1977, Vissars drove an Ekco truck to Mare Island where he met Keenberg. The truck had been loaded with sand and two barrels of metal washers, which were dumped inside the shipyard after the truck had been weighed. The truck was then loaded with aluminum, reweighed, and driven away. These procedures occurred again on August 24, 1977.

In October, 1977, a grand jury indicted Keenberg on two counts of theft of Government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 . It also indicted Vissars on two counts of aiding and abetting in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 . The men were tried jointly to a jury which found them guilty on all counts charged. Keenberg was sentenced on count I to one year’s imprisonment with five months to be spent in a jail-type facility and the rest of the sentence suspended. On count II he received five years’ probation to commence upon his release from incarceration; he was also ordered to pay a $5,000 fine. Vissars’ sentences on both counts were suspended and he was placed on five years’ probation with the condition that he pay a $200 fine. These appeals followed.

II. Vissar’s Appeal: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Vissars argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him guilty of aiding and abetting in the thefts and therefore the district court should have directed an acquittal. 1

Vissars acknowledges that in reviewing the jury’s verdict for sufficiency of the evi-

dence, this court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 , 62 S.Ct. 457 , 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Robinson, 546 F.2d 309, 314 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 918 , 97 S.Ct. 1333 , 51 L.Ed.2d 596 (1977); United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969). Moreover, as this court recently noted in United States v. Jones, 592 F.2d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 1979):

There was sufficient evidence to convict Vissars of aiding and abetting the thefts in violation of § 2. The jury could reasonably have found that Vissars drove the truck to Mare Island on both occasions, knew of the concealed sand and washers which he dumped once inside the shipyard. The jury could also reasonably have found that Vissars gave a statement to F.B.I. agent Larson in which he admitted that he surmised that the purpose of the sand and washers was to increase the tare weight of the empty truck so as to conceal extra scrap metal loaded into the truck after the sand and washers were emptied. The Government’s evidence was sufficient to support a reasonable jury’s conclusion that he aided and abetted the theft.

III. Keenberg’s Appeal: Alleged Bruton Violation

Keenberg contends that the district court committed prejudicial error in violation of his sixth amendment right to confrontation as enunciated in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968).

*403 At trial, the Government sought to introduce testimony by F.B.I. agent Larson about his conversation with Vissars after Vissars’ arrest. Counsel for Keenberg objected on the ground that the statement was hearsay and violated the Bruton rule. The judge allowed the Government to introduce the testimony against Vissars, though excising all references to Keenberg.

Although no mention was made of Keen-berg upon direct examination, on cross-examination by Vissars’ counsel Larson testified that Vissars stated that he had driven the Ekco truck to Mare Island on both August 17 and August 24, and that Keen-berg had flown from Los Angeles and met him at Mare Island on both occasions. Larson also testified that Vissars had said that Keenberg informed Vissars of the sand and washers in the truck and had generally directed Vissars’ actions on both occasions. Though the court had informed the parties that it would address objections to cross-examination at the time of the cross-examination, neither the Government nor Keen-berg’s attorney voiced an objection to Larson’s cross-examination testimony.

Nonetheless, upon this appeal Keenberg contends that certain statements attributed to Vissars by agent Larson prejudiced Keenberg and violated Bruton . In his brief before this court, Keenberg refers to the following statements and the inferences he claims the jury could draw:

We assume arguendo that agent Larson’s testimony concerning what Vissars had said violated the Bruton rule in light of Vissars’ not taking the stand. We conclude nonetheless that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).

It is clear that a violation of Bruton does not require an automatic reversal. United States v. Steed, 465 F.2d 1310, 1318 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1078 , 93 S.Ct. 697 , 34 L.Ed.2d 667 (1972). In Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 , 89 S.Ct. 1726 , 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), the Supreme Court held that under some circumstances, a Bruton violation could be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt so as to satisfy the standard set forth in Chapman v. California. There four defendants were tried together. The Government introduced confessions by each defendant save Harrington; only one of the three confessors took the stand at trial. The Court held that the purported Bruton violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming evidence of Harrington's guilt and the relatively insignificant impact of the co-defendants’ largely cumulative statements. Id. at 254 , 89 S.Ct. at 1726 . The Court stated: “Our judgment must be based on our own reading of the record and on what seems to us to have been the probable impact of the two confessions on the minds of an average jury.” Id.

In Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 , 92 S.Ct. 1056 , 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972), the Su *404 preme Court also found that a purported Bruton violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court wrote:

Id. at 430, 92 S.Ct. at 1059 .

Our reading of the record indicates that the alleged Bruton violation here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Harrington and Schneble . Keenberg testified in his own behalf and admitted the two thefts of the scrap metal, leaving as the only issue whether he had been entrapped by Baker. Keenberg reiterated all the evidence concerning his participation in the crime he now contends violated his rights when elicited from Larson. Both Keen-berg’s attorney and the district judge acknowledged that Keenberg had admitted the thefts. 2 Thus, the testimony of agent Larson was cumulative and provided the jury with no information they would not otherwise have heard. 3 Putting aside Larson’s testimony, Keenberg’s guilt was abundantly established. Based on our reading of the record, we conclude that Larson’s testimony had an insignificant impact, if any, upon the minds of the jurors. In short, any violation of Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

AFFIRMED.

. Although Vissars’ brief discusses the nature of the aiding and abetting offense, he does not contend that the district court misinstructed the jury as to the elements of aiding and abetting under § 2.

. For example, the judge stated: “Mr. Keen-berg on the stand made what amounted to a confession as far as the crime is concerned.”

. Keenberg also claims that Larson’s testimony was prejudicial because it detracted from the credibility of Keenberg’s own testimony. Inasmuch as Larson’s testimony corroborated Keenberg’s description of the crimes, its effect, if any, upon Keenberg’s credibility would have been to enhance the belief that Keenberg was accurately relating the events.