concurring:

The district court rested the interlocutory order under review “solely on the authority of Giusti v. Pyrotechnic Industries, 156 F.2d 351 (9th Cir.) cert. denied 329 U.S. 787 (1946).” I agree that Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953), has undercut Giusti .

Both Giusti and Bankers Life interpreted and applied the venue provisions of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15 , 22. Appellee has chosen to rely solely upon these special venue provisions of the Clayton Act and upon Giusti both in this court and in the court below.

The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391 , is also applicable to antitrust suits and may provide a basis for venue when the special venue provisions of the Clayton Act do not. See, e. g., Ballard v. Blue Shield of Southern West Virginia, Inc., 543 F.2d 1075, 1080 (4th Cir. 1976); Board of County Commissioners v. Wilshire Oil, 523 F.2d 125 , 129-30 (10th Cir. 1975); 15 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil § 3818 at 109, 112 (1976); 1 Moore’s Federal Practice ¶ 0.144[14.-15] at 1562.

Subsection (b) of section 1391 was added to the statute in 1966, well after Giusti and Bankers Life & Casualty were decided. It permits a nondiversity civil action to be brought in the district “in which the claim arose.” This provision was intended “to assure that at least one venue will be proper as to all defendants . in a multi-party action.” Great Western United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1273 (5th Cir. 1978) quoting 1 Moore’s Federal *497 Practice H 0.142[5.-2] at 1434. See also Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Industries, Inc., 406 U.S. 706 , 710 n. 8, 92 S.Ct. 1936 , 32 L.Ed.2d 428 (1972); 15 Wright & Miller, supra, § 3807 at 39.

Because appellee has chosen to rely solely on the Clayton Act venue provisions, neither the court below nor this court has had occasion to consider the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (b) to appellee’s claim.