United States v. Robert Keith

Appellant Robert Keith, a Navajo Indian, was indicted on the charge of involuntary manslaughter within the confines of the Navajo Indian Reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1158 and 1112. Before trial, Keith moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege two essential elements of the offense charged. After oral argument, the trial judge denied the motion. Keith was convicted after a jury trial.

Keith argues that his conviction should be reversed on the ground that the district court erred in denying the motion. We agree with his argument and reverse.

Keith was charged under § 1112 with involuntary manslaughter after the automobile he was driving collided with another vehicle, killing the driver. Section 1112 provides in pertinent part:

The indictment tracked the language of § 1112 in charging that Keith operated his vehicle “without due caution and circumspection.”

Keith contends that two essential elements of the offense of involuntary manslaughter under § 1112 are that: (1) the defendant committed with gross negligence the action causing death; and (2) the defendant had actual knowledge that his conduct was a threat to the lives of others, or had knowledge of…

dissenting:

I dissent.

The majority holds that the statutory language “without due caution or circumspection” must be construed to require gross negligence or the knowledge of such circumstances as would have made reasonably foreseeable to the defendant the peril to which his acts might subject others. Whether this is or is not the proper standard to apply in involuntary manslaughter is a question I do not reach. I assume, arguendo, that it is. It was the one adopted by the district court in instructing the jury as to the meaning of the statutory language.

I disagree with the majority in its conclusion that the imposition of this standard amounts to adding a new element to the crime of involuntary manslaughter, which element must be expressly stated in the indictment,

A distinction must be made between two different situations: (1) Where judicial or decisional gloss adds new elements to a crime; 1 (2) Where the gloss does no more than define the meaning of an element set forth in the statute. In the former case the newly added elements must be included in an indictment. In the latter case no new element has been added. The element set forth in the statute which has been…

605 F.2d 462 UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert KEITH, Appellant. No. 79-1075. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Sept. 26, 1979. Michael B. Scott, Asst. U. S. Atty., Phoenix, Ariz., for appellee. Michael L. Piccarreta, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Phoenix, Ariz., for appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Before MERRILL and HUG, Circuit Judges, and PORT * , Senior District Judge. HUG, Circuit Judge: 1 Appellant Robert Keith, a Navajo Indian, was indicted on the charge of involuntary manslaughter within the confines of the Navajo Indian Reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 1112. Before trial, Keith moved to dismiss the indictment for failure to allege two essential elements of the offense charged. After oral argument, the trial judge denied the motion. Keith was convicted after a jury trial. 2 Keith argues that his conviction should be reversed on the ground that the district court erred in denying the motion. We agree with his argument and reverse. 3 Keith was charged under § 1112 with involuntary manslaughter after the automobile he was driving collided with another vehicle,…