The case raises questions concerning the Government’s tort liability for the acts of a drug informant. Plaintiff Larry Michael Slagle brought this action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA or Act), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 (b), 2671 et seq. Slagle was paralyzed when he was shot in a gun battle. He sued the United States, on the theory that his injuries were caused by the negligence of the Government in the selection and supervision of a drug informant involved in the shooting incident, and by the informant’s negligence at the site of the incident. The United States filed both a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and a motion for partial summary judgment. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, but granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Government. Slagle appeals from this order. We affirm.

We state the relevant facts in the manner most favorable to plaintiff, as we are required to do on this appeal. Plaintiff and one Chester Wheeler had undertaken a nonprofit community service project in Richmond, California, with the goal of reducing drug abuse in that area. Upon the recommendation of a local police officer, Wheeler had contacted the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), now known as the Drug Enforcement Administration, and volunteered to make himself available as an informant. Wheeler met with agent Robert Bender of the BNDD. During the' meeting, Bender informed Wheeler that BNDD informants must comply with the following general guidelines:

In return for his services, the BNDD agreed to pay money to Wheeler on a per job basis. Apart from the general guidelines, Wheeler had very broad discretion over the details of his informant activities.

On the day he was injured, Slagle voluntarily accompanied Wheeler at Wheeler’s request. A narcotics dealer named “John-John,” about whom plaintiff was attempting to secure information, had requested Wheeler to accompany him and another man on a trip to Napa to collect money owed to John-John and to offer illegal drugs for sale. According to plaintiff, Bender was aware generally that Wheeler was attempting to befriend John-John in order to set up a drug transaction between John-John and BNDD agents. Wheeler was carrying a gun, in violation of the BNDD guidelines. Before leaving for Napa, Wheeler called the BNDD. Bender, his contact at the agency, was unavailable for reasons which the record does not disclose. Wheeler left a message regarding his plans to travel to Napa and the general purpose of the trip, but did not secure approval for the trip from anyone at the agency.

At the meeting place in Napa, an argument broke out regarding collection of the money, and Wheeler drew a gun. The argument continued and Wheeler struck one of the residents of the house. A shooting ensued, and as Slagle ran toward the car he was shot in the back and paralyzed. He was driven away from the site by John-John, apparently at the direction of one of the residents of the house, and left alongside the highway.

On October 16, 1974, one day before expiration of the mandatory claim period for filing claims, 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b), plaintiff served a purported claim under the FTCA on four government agencies. The agencies either returned plaintiff’s claim or took no action on it. Receiving no decision from the agencies within six months after filing the claim, 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a), plaintiff filed suit against the United States.

Plaintiff’s complaint is vague as to which acts of Wheeler or the Government were negligent. Plaintiff states only that

In later proceedings below, plaintiff alleged Wheeler was negligent in various respects, and that the United States is responsible in these circumstances for Wheeler’s negligence. Plaintiff states only in vague terms the acts allegedly constituting Wheeler’s negligence. He claims Wheeler negligently handled some facet of the transaction in Napa, but fails to elaborate; he claims Wheeler negligently carried a gun to the meeting, although plaintiff was clearly aware of this fact; finally, he claims Wheeler was negligent in some respect in not notifying the BNDD before taking the trip.

Independent Contractor or Employee

The district court concluded that Wheeler was not an employee, but instead was an independent contractor. We disagree with the court’s characterization of Wheeler as an independent contractor, but agree with the portion of the court’s opinion holding Wheeler was not an employee, as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 2671 . With appropriate changes in footnote numbering, we adopt the district court’s careful analysis of the employee issue and set it forth as follows:

Negligent Selection of Wheeler

We also agree with the district court’s conclusion that the Government was not negligent in selecting Wheeler as an informer. On this point the district court held, and we agree, as follows:

Negligent Communication System

- Slagle also claims that the Government itself was negligent in failing to establish and maintain “a foolproof means of rapid communication” between drug informants and their contacts. The Government’s decision regarding the kind of communication system it wishes to establish between informants and their contacts, and in particular the policy decision whether the benefits of a “foolproof means of rapid communication” justify the associated costs, is, like the decision to use informants in the first place, a discretionary function immune from challenge under the Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 . See generally Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1979); Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1975); Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975); Redmond v. United States, 518 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1975); Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160 (E.D.Pa.1978).

Ultra-hazardous Activity

There remains the question whether or not Wheeler was an independent contractor of the Government. If he were, the plaintiff could contend that the Government is liable under the nondelegable duty doctrine applicable to dangerous activities. Historically, the employer of an independent contractor was not liable for the misconduct of the contractor or his employees. Thorne v. United States, 479 F.2d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 1973). One rationale for this rule is that the employer has little or no authority to direct the performance of the contractor.

A major exception to the above rule now appears well-settled, at least as far as private employers are concerned. The Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes a non-delegable duty of due care on the employer of an independent contractor where the work to be performed involves special dangers. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 416 (1965) provides:

Similarly, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 427 (1965) provides:

The California courts have embraced the principle described in these Restatement sections, see, e. g., Van Arsdale v. Hollinger, 68 Cal.2d 245 , 66 Cal.Rptr. 20 , 437 P.2d 508 (1968); Aceves v. Regal Pake Brewing Co., 24 Cal.3d 502 , 156 Cal.Rptr. 41 , 595 P.2d 619 (1979). This circuit has applied some version of the nondelegable duty doctrine in FTCA cases, see, e. g., Thorne v. United States, 479 F.2d 804 (9th Cir. 1973); McGar-ry v. United States, 549 F.2d 587 (9th Cir. 1976).

We need not decide whether the activities of a drug informant involve peculiar risks or special dangers to others, as defined in Restatement sections 416 or 427, for we conclude Wheeler here was not acting as an independent contractor. We think that during the time the events in question occurred, Wheeler did not have a sufficiently close relationship with the Government that he could be characterized as an “independent contractor,” as that term is used in the Restatement of Torts and the cases cited above. Of course, an independent contractor does not lose his status as such simply because he breaches his contract by violating safety provisions specified by the employer. Both the Restatement and the relevant cases recognize that the employer may sometimes be liable for the independent contractor’s negligence even when it requires by contract that certain precautions be taken. In this case, however, Wheeler’s proceeding with the meeting without first notifying BNDD agents constituted more than simply a failure of an independent contractor to take required safety precautions. In these circumstances the relation of employer and independent contractor simply failed to arise.

The relationship between Wheeler and the Government was one in which the Government initially expressed a willingness to deal with Wheeler on certain terms, such as compliance with the guidelines. Wheeler was required to make an offer to the Government before undertaking an assignment. Prior notification was a prerequisite to the contractual relationship. Wheeler was neither authorized nor obliged contractually to do anything for the BNDD prior to contacting it and obtaining permission to attempt a particular drug transaction. The record shows that he had contacted the Government for a job only once previously, and that assignment had failed. Similarly, we doubt that the BNDD was obliged to pay Wheeler for information he gathered, absent such notification.

In the normal independent contractor case addressed in the authorities cited above, the employer may not know the independent contractor is violating the contract safety provisions, but it does know that the contractor is working and that he is authorized, indeed obliged, to further the employer’s purposes by engaging in hazardous activities. Here, because of Wheeler’s failure to inform the Government, there was no opportunity for the Government either to deny approval for the trip, or to take whatever safety precautions it may have found necessary. Wheeler may not have been a complete stranger or volunteer vis-a-vis the Government during the events in question, but he more closely resembled a volunteer than an independent contractor.

There may be times where an informer such as Wheeler, working under government supervision, could act negligently in ways making the United States liable as the employer of an independent contractor. Agreeing to become a government informant, however, does not make a person an independent contractor at all times thereafter, and does not result in the Government’s being held liable at all times for the negligence of the informant.

Plaintiff’s other contentions on this appeal are without merit. For the above rea sons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) reads in pertinent part: Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States, for money damages . . for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2674 reads in pertinent part: The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages. . As originally filed, this case contained two separate causes of action. The Government’s motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted on May 25, 1977, was with respect to the first cause of action only. Plaintiffs second cause of action, for malpractice, was dismissed by stipulation of the parties on July 8, 1977. The district court thereupon entered its judgment dismissing the entire action. It is from this final judgment that plaintiff now appeals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . . Precisely how much or what kind of information and cooperation was required before the Government became obliged to pay Wheeler for a job is unclear from the record. The record shows that in the only other transaction before the events leading to plaintiffs injury, Bender attempted to set up a “buy” of heroin in Berkeley from a person introduced by Wheeler, the deal fell through, and Wheeler was not paid. Plaintiff also alleges that Bender gave him some kind of assurances that he would aid Wheeler in applying for federal aid to his community services project. . Wheeler had asked the BNDD for a permit to carry a concealed weapon, and the agency had denied his request. . Our disposition makes it unnecessary to consider the issue, but we have grave doubts whether plaintiffs claim, which did not include the name of any government agency, the date on which the incident occurred, clear identification of the place of the injury, the names of any BNDD agents involved, or the fact that drugs were involved, was sufficiently complete that the receiving government agencies were obliged to transfer the claim to the appropriate agency pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (a). We doubt that service on the Department of Justice was service on “the appropriate agency,” 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a), since the BNDD is only one of twenty-two separate agencies within the Department. Finally, plaintiff has presented no amplification on this appeal of the manner in which the alleged promise of an HEW employee on November 1, 1974, about two weeks beyond the two-year limitation period on FTCA claims, to investigate plaintiffs claim further would activate the relating-back provisions of 28 C.F.R. § 14.2 (a). . This court has recently expressed doubt whether, to the extent the nondelegable duty doctrine equates employees and independent contractors for purposes of determining liabili ty, the FTCA ought to be interpreted as permitting imposition of liability on the Government in every circumstance where a private employer would be liable under such a theory, see Bramer v. United States, 595 F.2d 1141 , 1144 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979). . We do not foreclose the possibility that in some future case involving a long period of relations between the Government and an informant, where the Government had routinely approved many proposed activities of the informant, the Government could be held to have impliedly approved an act taken without the informant securing prior authorization. . Our conclusion also finds some support in the fact that the BNDD told Wheeler it could treat him as a stranger if he violated the guidelines; indeed, Wheeler was prosecuted by state authorities for attempted murder, with BNDD’s knowledge. While we assume the BNDD could similarly disclaim the acts of an acknowledged employee, the serious consequences of noncompliance with the guidelines illustrates the importance attached to them by the BNDD in regulating its dealings with informants.