This petition to set aside an action of the Interstate Commerce Commission presents a question of the justiciability of a review of an action by the Commission which contained no affirmative order, no sanction, did not change the status of any party, and had no binding effect on anyone.

The Commission action was denominated “Decision and Order, No. W-C-29 Pacific Towboat and Salvage Company — Investigation of Operations.” It concludes with the following language:

As stated by the administrative law judge in his report which was adopted by the Commission:

The Acts which are under investigation were not in dispute. As found by the administrative trial judge, they may be stated as follows:

The administrative law judge concluded that the subject transportation was performed by PTS as a contract carrier by water in interstate commerce between California points and Tacoma for compensation and was therefore subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. The ALJ also noted that “the subject transportation has long ceased and respondent has no intention of reviving this operation now or in the future, but an abundance of caution dictates that there is the ever possibility of the operation’s being resumed. Thus, a cease and desist order will be entered.”

Upon its review, the Commission affirmed “the statement of facts, conclusions, and findings in [the administrative law judge’s] initial decision,” but stated “we do not believe that the issuance of a cease and desist order is an appropriate remedy.” The Commission did, however, include the following statement in its decision:

The Commission then stated:

It is ordered:

This investigation proceeding is discontinued.

PTS contends that the Commission erred in determining that the carriage was interstate as between California and Tacoma, Washington, contending rather that it was transportation from California ports to Alaska and, thus, under the jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime Board by virtue of the Alaska Statehood Act.

Neither the United States, as defendant, nor the Interstate Commerce Commission has by separate motion, moved in this Court for a dismissal of the appeal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because of the absence of a live case or controversy under Article III of the Constitution. On appeal, the United States expressly pretermits a discussion of this question. The ICC raises the case or controversy issue in its brief. Of course, since the jurisdiction of the court under Article III is always open to inquiry upon the court’s own motion, we proceed directly to this question.

As we have noted, although the document entered by the ICC following its investigation is headed “decision and order,” it is quite doubtful that it is such an order as is contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (a) which provides as follows:

As the Supreme Court has stated in a case in which a final report on valuation for rate making purposes had been made by the Commission in the form of an order:

United States v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake R. R. Co., 273 U.S. 299, 309 , 47 S.Ct. 413, 414 , 71 L.Ed. 651 (1927).

273 U.S. at 309, 310 , 47 S.Ct. at 414 .

The Court thus sought to characterize an order as one which carried into effect one of the results mentioned by it. In Proctor & Gamble v. United States, 225 U.S. 282 , 32 S. Ct. 761 , 56 L.Ed. 1091 (1912), the Court carefully analyzed the provisions. of the predecessor Judiciary Act of March 3, 1911, supra, to determine what was contemplated by the Congress by the words “order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.” In discussing the words of the subdivision which are applicable here, the Court said:

225 U.S. at 293, 32 S.Ct. at 765.

Throughout the Proctor & Gamble opinion, the Court spoke of an order as being in the nature of an “affirmative command of the Commission.”

The ICC argument as to the want of jurisdiction of this Court is well stated in the early case of United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 253 U.S. 113 , 40 S.Ct. 448 , 64 L.Ed. 808 (1920):

253 U.S. at 116 , 40 S.Ct. at 449 .

Here, we have no question of mootness. Nothing has occurred pending the litigation that has made an issue, once viable, no longer subject to resolution in a manner to affect the parties. We have, instead, the problem of a complete absence of a case or controversy under Article III.

The appellant insists that, in the event that we should determine that this order is not reviewable, we should apply the mootness doctrine by not only dismissing the petition here but by vacating the order of the Commission. In doing so, it relies on United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36 , 71 S.Ct. 104 , 95 L.Ed. 36 (1950) and Board of Regents of the University of Texas System v. New Left Education Project, 414 U.S. 807 , 94 S.Ct. 118 , 38 L.Ed.2d 43 (1973). In neither of those cases was the Court faced with the contention that the trial court did not originally have jurisdiction under the case or controversy provisions of the Constitution. The only contention was that pending the appeal in each of the cases, action had been taken by the parties that mooted the case. Here, being faced with a question of original jurisdiction in this Court, we must decide that issue, before we ever face the question of mootness. Upon finding, as we do, that we do not have jurisdiction, our inquiry ends and we lack the power to vacate the order of the ICC.

The Petition is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

. Section 10921 of Title 49 (formerly Section 309(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 909(f)) provides: Except as provided in this subchapter or another law, a person may provide transportation or service subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission under subchapter . . . (iii) [water carrier transportation] ... of Chapter 105 of this Title . . . only if the person holds the appropriate certificate, permit, or license issued under this subchapter authorizing the transportation or service. . Section 27(b) of the Alaska Statehood Act, 48 U.S.C. Prec. 21, provides: Nothing contained in this or any other Act shall be construed as depriving the Federal Maritime Board of the exclusive jurisdiction heretofore conferred on it over common carriers engaged in transportation by water between any port in the State of Alaska and other ports in the United States, its Territories or possessions, or as conferring upon the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction over transportation by water between any such ports. . The Urgent Deficiencies Act, October 22, 1913, C. 32, 38 Stat. 208 , 219 is the predecessor of the present statute cited above, and it was preceded by substantially the same language by the first section of the Act of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539 , C. 309, now Section 207 of the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1087 , 1148 (hereinafter discussed).