Leonard Ginter v. State Bar of Nevada

Ginter appeals the dismissal of his pro se case against the Nevada State Bar Association and two attorneys.

As to the bar association, it is obvious that the district judge intended to dismiss the action because he believed no possible amendment could cure the complaint. Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d 1336, 1338 (9th Cir. 1978); Lanning v. Serwold, 474 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1973). The district court held such an organization is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , apparently relying on Clark v. State of Washington, 366 F.2d 678, 681 (9th Cir. 1966). Clark , however, relies indirectly on the holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 , 81 S.Ct. 473, 484-486 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (a municipality is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983), and that part of Monroe has been expressly overruled in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 , 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035-2036 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

Nevertheless, Supreme Court case law decided subsequent to Monell has made it clear that Monell does not alter the rule that § 1983 does not constitute an abrogation of the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states. E. g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.…