United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio v. Bell Foundry Company, United Steelworkers of America, Afl-Cio v. Bell Foundry Company

On November 30,1977, Bell Foundry (the employer) mailed discharge notices to four striking employees. This occurred several months after the expiration of Bell’s, previous Collective Bargaining Agreement with United Steelworkers (the union) and shortly before a new agreement was signed. The union instituted this action to compel arbi *140 tration of the discharges. The district court held that the discharges were not arbitrable under the new contract, and only that portion of the judgment is now at issue. 1 We reverse because at the time the discharges became effective the second contract had come into being.

Following expiration of the old contract in August, 1977, and during the subsequent strike by the union, the union and the employer continued negotiations for a new contract. On November 21, the employer sent to the union a proposal, which stated that it would remain open until December 1. On November 23, the employer sent a clarification of one provision of the offer unrelated to any arbitration provisions at issue here, and granted the union’s request that the offer remain open for a few more days. 2 On December 1, the union accepted the offer, making no mention of the…

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

The district court in ordering arbitration under the old contract explicitly indicated that he was deciding only one legal issue, viz., the effective date of the second contract. II. R.T. 8. In holding that the effective date was December 5,1977, the district court said “. . . the acceptance was not of the precise offer made and the contract did not arise because the offeror made clear that it was not going to accept the different acceptance and insisted on precise acceptance of its second and modified offer. And the precise acceptance of the second and modified offer was not forthcoming until December 5th; which thus, in my view, would be the effective date of the second contract.” Id. at 11. In my opinion the district court is correct. A recital of basic contract doctrines is not necessary to support this conclusion. It is enough to observe that selecting the time at which from the chrysalis of negotiations emerges a legally binding contract evades scientifically precise determination, although all admit it must be guided by the manifested intent of the parties. I cannot say the majority is wholly wrong; I simply think the district court was…

626 F.2d 139 105 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2556 , 89 Lab.Cas. P 12,248 UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Petitioner-Appellee, v. BELL FOUNDRY COMPANY, Respondent-Appellant. UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO, Petitioner-Appellant, v. BELL FOUNDRY COMPANY, Respondent-Appellee. Nos. 78-2083, 78-2315. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Feb. 4, 1980. Decided Aug. 25, 1980. James G. Johnson, Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Los Angeles, Cal., for Bell Foundry Co. Daniel McIntyre, Pittsburgh, Pa., for United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before SNEED, SCHROEDER and ALARCON, Circuit Judges. SCHROEDER, Circuit Judge: 1 On November 30, 1977, Bell Foundry (the employer) mailed discharge notices to four striking employees. This occurred several months after the expiration of Bell's previous Collective Bargaining Agreement with United Steelworkers (the union) and shortly before a new agreement was signed. The union instituted this action to compel arbitration of the discharges. The district court held that the discharges were not arbitrable under the new contract, and only…