United States v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 701, and Russell E. Joy

Appellants were indicted for violating the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1976) 11. The district court dismissed the indictment on the ground that the Attorney General had failed to exhaust the administrative remedy before the Federal Election Commission (FEC), available under section 437g of the Act, before seeking an indictment. We conclude Congress did not intend to impose this limitation upon the power of the Attorney General to enforce the law. We therefore reverse.

The administrative remedy was added to the statute by amendments adopted in 1974, effective on January 1, 1975, and in 1976. The government argues that the administrative remedy is therefore inapplicable to the alleged violations, which occurred in 1974. See note 1. We do not reach this question, for we conclude that even if the administrative remedy applied, its exhaustion was not a prerequisite to indictment.

We approach the interpretation of the statute with a presumption against a congressional intention to limit the power of the Attorney General to prosecute offenses under the criminal laws of the United States. In general, the “conduct [of] federal criminal litigation ... is ‘an…