Nancy S. Bradshaw, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated v. Zoological Society of San Diego

Appellant Nancy Bradshaw, acting in propria persona, filed this sex discrimination action in early 1975, alleging that she was unlawfully denied employment by the Zoological Society in 1969 and again in 1971. 1 She had earlier filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the EEOC had found “reasonable cause” to believe that the Zoological Society discriminated against Bradshaw in denying her application for the position of education director at the Zoo. 2

In April of 1975, the district court granted summary judgment to the Zoological Society, finding Bradshaw’s claims under both Title VII and section 1983 to be time-barred. Bradshaw appealed. Nearly three years later, a panel of this court reversed both determinations, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066 (9th Cir. 1978).

Proceedings in the district court resumed with the filing of an answer to the complaint in April of 1978. Shortly thereafter, Bradshaw filed a motion for appointment of counsel pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 2000e-5(f)(l)(B), 3 and for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 4 Supporting affidavits were filed detailing…

dissenting:

I would not reach the merits of this appeal because this case is not properly before us. We lack jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from an order denying appointment of counsel in a Title VII case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.

We are a court of limited jurisdiction and have no power to reach out beyond our jurisdiction to correct errors. The Supreme Court has recently cautioned that “interlocutory orders are not appealable ‘on the mere ground that they may be erroneous.’ ” Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 at 378 , 101 S.Ct. 669 at 675 , 66 L.Ed.2d 571 (1981) (Risjord), quoting Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 , 98 n.6, 88 S.Ct. 269 , 275 n.6, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967). The order from which Bradshaw appeals satisfies neither 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , nor the collateral order exception as set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 , 69 S.Ct. 1221 , 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) (Cohen). Therefore, we have no jurisdiction to decide the case. 1

The Supreme Court has emphasized the strong policy behind the rule that appeals are to be made only following final judgment on the merits. 2 Similarly, the Court *1321 has stressed that…

662 F.2d 1301 27 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 841 , 67 A.L.R.Fed. 889, 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 32,296 Nancy S. BRADSHAW, Individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZOOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., Defendant-Appellee. No. 79-3051. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Dec. 4, 1980. Decided Dec. 7, 1981. Colleen M. O'Connor, E.E.O.C., San Diego, Cal., argued, for plaintiff-appellant; Nancy S. Bradshaw, in pro per., on brief. Robert W. Bell, Jr., Gary, Cary, Ames & Frye, San Diego, Cal., argued, for defendant-appellee; Donald N. Bauhofer, San Diego, Cal., on brief. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. Before WALLACE, SKOPIL, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges. REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: 1 Appellant Nancy Bradshaw, acting in propria persona, filed this sex discrimination action in early 1975, alleging that she was unlawfully denied employment by the Zoological Society in 1969 and again in 1971. 1 She had earlier filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the EEOC had found "reasonable cause" to believe that the Zoological Society discriminated…