concurring.

I concur in the result and in Parts III and IV of the memorandum. I do not disagree with the analysis in Part II of the memorandum, but I find it to be entirely unnecessary and to carry with it the implication that the jurisdiction of a magistrate is *1079 something separate and distinct from the jurisdiction of the district court.

Both of these criminal prosecutions were initiated by criminal complaints, one charging a misdemeanor and the other charging an act of juvenile delinquency, which were filed with a United States Magistrate for the Southern District of California pursuant to Rule 3 Fed.R.Cr.P. Subsequently, in each case, an Information was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California charging each appellant with an act of juvenile delinquency pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5032 .

The seminal issue involved is whether the Congress when it enacted and amended the Magistrates Act and the Supreme Court when it adopted and amended the Magistrates Rules of Procedure intended to grant to litigants a right to insist that proceedings be held before a magistrate rather than a district judge. To put it another way, does a magistrate have jurisdiction which a district judge does not have?

This is not an occasion — a case with three concurring opinions — for a complete and thorough discussion of the issues. Suffice it to say, that in my opinion there is one court, the district court. There is no magistrate’s court. Congress has identified officials who have been granted authority, under special circumstances, to perform judicial functions of the district court. Nevertheless, the entire jurisdiction of the district court is vested in the district judge and anything a magistrate does is, under the statute and rules, subject to the control, supervision and review of a district judge. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 , 100 S.Ct. 2406 , 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980).

(Emphasis added). See also: McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Commodore Business Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309 , 9th Cir. 1981. Compare: United States v. Hayes, 590 F.2d 309 (9th Cir. 1979).

In the instant cases there was no standing order or rule, or special order pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (a) specially designating a magistrate to exercise the jurisdiction of the district court in juvenile delinquency cases. In the Gonzalez-Cervantes case, respondent filed a consent to trial before the magistrate but a magistrate was never specially designated. In the Doe case a consent to trial before the magistrate was filed and at one point the district judge designated a magistrate to hear the matter, but the judge subsequently on motion of the government vacated the order and reassumed jurisdiction. All these actions were proper under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (f).

With respect to these issues I perceive no difference between adult misdemeanor cases and juvenile delinquency cases, and thus no justification for deciding on the basis of such a distinction.