Taxpayers, Robert and Nancy Huettl, appeal the dismissal of their suit for tax refund. The district court ruled the action was barred by the statute of limitations for bringing refund claims in district court, I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1), and we affirm.

Taxpayers filed a joint federal income tax return for 1968 on or about April 1, 1969, and, on April 4, 1972, filed a refund claim alleging that a foreign tax credit carryover was available for the year 1968. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disallowed the claim on July 23, 1974, for the reason that, inter alia, 1 a three-year statute *241 of limitations for filing with the IRS barred the claim. See I.R.C. § 6511(a). 2

In 1978, we decided United States v. Woodmansee, 578 F.2d 1302 (9th Cir. 1978), and implied that the ten-year limitations period of I.R.C. § 6511(d)(3)(A), 3 and not the three-year limitations period of I.R.C. § 6511(a), applied to the filing of claims such as taxpayers’ with the IRS. Upon the assumption that the Woodmansee decision changed the legal posture of their claim, taxpayers made two filings on August 25, 1978. One was a suit for refund with the district court based on the disallowance of the first claim by the IRS. Taxpayers voluntarily dismissed the suit when they realized that it was barred by a two-year statute of limitations governing the amount of time an action for refund can be presented to a district court after an adverse IRS ruling. See I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1). 4 The other was a claim for refund with the IRS. Except for its reference to the Woodmansee decision, it was identical to the first administrative claim. The crux of both administrative claims was taxpayers’ asserted entitlement to a foreign tax credit carryover. The taxpayers’ entitlement to the carryover, aside from the limitations issue, was wholly unaffected by the Woodmansee decision. The IRS disallowed the second claim on July 10, 1979.

Taxpayers then filed the instant suit for refund in the district court on August 30, 1979, within two years of the second IRS disallowance. The district court reasoned that taxpayers’ second claim for refund with the IRS was identical to their first, that the second claim therefore could not extend the two-year limitations period of I.RiC. § 6532(a)(1), that the limitations period for the second district court suit thereby began running on or about the date of the first IRS disallowance of July 23, 1974, and that the second district court action was thus barred by I.R.C. § 6532(aXl). The court dismissed the action on this basis, and we affirm.

A taxpayer generally may file more than one administrative refund claim within the statutory period applicable to the filing of claims with the IRS. E.g., 18th Street Leader Stores, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.2d 113, 115 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 725 , 65 S.Ct. 61 , 89 L.Ed. 583 (1944); Union Commerce Bank v. United States, 463 F.Supp. 842, 843 (N.D.Ohio 1978), affirmed, 638 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1981). However, a second claim for refund on grounds identical to those in the first does not extend the two-year limitations period of I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) for bringing suit in a district court. E.g., Union Commerce Bank v. United States, 638 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1981); Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 1974); Stratmore v. United States, 463 F.2d 1195, 1197 (3d Cir. 1972). For purposes of limitations on suit, it makes no difference that the IRS *242 acted on the second claim, Einson-Freeman Co. v. Corwin, 112 F.2d 683, 684 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 693 , 61 S.Ct. 75 , 85 L.Ed. 449 (1940), and this is true even where the taxpayer meets the statute of limitations for filing with the IRS on the second claim. Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291, 1292-93 (10th Cir. 1974).

The principal issue thus becomes whether the taxpayers’ second refund claim is identical to the first. If the second claim is based on different facts or legal theories from those contained in the first, then the second claim may merit independent treatment from the statute of limitations of I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1). Charlson Realty Co. v. United States, 384 F.2d 434, 439 (Ct.Cl.1967).

An intervening change in the law between the disallowance of the first claim filed with the IRS and the bringing of a suit on the second claim in the district court is an insufficient basis on which to distinguish two claims. Einson-Freeman Co. v. Corwin, 112 F.2d 683, 683-84 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 693 , 61 S.Ct. 75 , 85 L.Ed. 449 (1940). Here, the sole difference between taxpayers’ first and second claims is a reference to the intervening Woodmansee decision. Taxpayers did not introduce different facts, statutory grounds, or theoretical bases for recovery, and their claims were therefore identical. 5

Courts have intimated that even if two claims are identical, the first claim should not trigger the limitations period of I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) if it was so poorly prepared as to be a nullity. See Union Commerce Bank v. United States, 463 F.Supp. 842, 843-44 (N.D.Ohio 1978), affirmed, 638 F.2d 962 (6th Cir. 1981); W. A. Schemmer Limestone Quarry, Inc. v. United States, 240 F.Supp. 356, 359-60 (S.D.Iowa 1964). These cases involved taxpayers whose first claims arguably did not set forth enough detail to meet government regulations and to apprise the IRS of the basis for the claims. In the instant case, there has been no showing that taxpayers’ first claim failed to meet specificity requirements or that the IRS failed to understand the first claim. Indeed, the IRS disallowed the first claim on the ground taxpayers urge it to reconsider in the second claim, that is, on the statute of limitations issue. 6

Because taxpayers’ first claim was not a nullity and because their first and second claims were identical, the limitations period of I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1) began to run for the instant action on the date of the mailing of a notice of the disallowance of taxpayers’ first claim, on or about July 23, 1974. This case was filed more than five years after that date and so was barred by the two-year limitations period of I.R.C. § 6532(a)(1). The importance of the policy favoring finality in the determination of claims mandates that a decision on a refund claim based upon an erroneous view of the law is not open to collateral attack. It can be corrected by a timely filing of a suit for refund, not by resubmitting an identical refund claim. See Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 , 101 S.Ct. 2424 , 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981). For these reasons, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

. The parties dispute whether the IRS based its denial solely on the statute of limitations. However, it is immaterial to the resolution of this case whether the IRS denied taxpayers’ claim for additional reasons.

. The section reads in relevant part:

. The section reads in relevant part:

. The provision reads in pertinent part:

. The dissent concludes that “the assertion of a different appropriate statute of limitations is a different legal ground in support of the Huettls’ second claim.” We need not decide whether reliance on a different statute of limitations would have distinguished taxpayers’ two administrative claims because our understanding is that taxpayers asserted the ten-year statute of limitations in their first administrative claim.

. The dissent suggests the disallowance of taxpayers’ first administrative claim was not made on the merits and therefore cannot be used to bar taxpayers’ second claim. We disagree. It is because the IRS decided the merits of the statute of limitations issue that the limitations question is barred from being considered again. A judgment in one forum on statute of limitations grounds is a decision on the merits for purposes of res judicata preclusion of any reconsideration in that forum of the limitations question. E.g., Hildebrand v. Dart Industries, Inc., 640 F.2d 289, 291 (10th Cir. 1981); Mathis v. Laird, 457 F.2d 926, 927 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 871 , 93 S.Ct. 201 , 34 L.Ed.2d 122 (1972); Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 921 , 71 S.Ct. 743 , 95 L.Ed. 1355 (1951); IB J. Moore Federal Practice 110.409[6] (2d ed. 1980).