dissenting:

The majority accepts a rule of evidence that, if given wider application, will have devastating consequences for Americans who encounter legal difficulties while travelling abroad for business or pleasure. Under the majority’s analysis, an authenticated document that a foreign state labels as a public record can be admitted in our courts without the foundation necessary for admitting business records. In a country such as Hungary, where the state controls numerous activities that would be characterized as private here, virtually all documents assume a public label. As a consequence of that fact and today’s holding, a vast array of so-called public records become admissible in our courts without the proof required for the business records exception to the hearsay rule — proof by the custodian of records or other qualified witness that the record was made in the regular course of business and that it was the *760 regular practice of the business to make the record.

This very case illustrates the harm that is possible when a foreign business document is admitted against a criminal defendant upon the flimsy foundation condoned by the majority. Mr. Regner has been convicted through the introduction of a document purporting to show the absence of a “public” record in the files of a Hungarian taxicab company. This document was introduced to prove that Regner never suffered an accident in Hungary. We know nothing about record keeping in Hungary. Are we to believe that a Hungarian taxicab company, by virtue of the label “public,” is gifted with a reliability and omniscience that we would never presume to exist in its private counterpart in our own country?

I see no reason to relax the foundational requirements for the records of a Hungarian taxicab company, especially since there is no reason to suppose that the indicia of reliability are stronger for such “public” records than for the private records of American businesses.

I.

By referring to the proposition that errors not raised below will not be considered on appeal, the majority attempts to justify its failure to address the issue of the admissibility of the Hungarian “public” records under the Federal Rules of Evidence. However, that proposition has no application to the instant case, since Regner’s counsel did object to the admissibility of the document in the district court. Over counsel’s relevancy, lack of foundation, and hearsay objections, the court admitted a certified document from the Hungarian People’s Republic indicating that a search made of Fovarosi Autotaxi Vallalat disclosed no record of a taxi accident involving Regner. Thus, counsel made specific and timely objections to the admission of the evidence below. Furthermore, the objections are sufficient to call into question the applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence, because only by some possible application of those rules could the evidence objected to have been admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule and without the foundation required for business records.

On appeal, Regner continued to argue that the admission of the foreign documents was reversible error, raising for the first time the Confrontation Clause issue. I find it curious that the majority avoids the hearsay and foundation issues actually raised below by so readily accepting the statement in Regner’s brief that authenticated foreign public documents are admissible through a combination of Fed.R.Evid. 803(10) and 902(3). This court is not bound by the counsel’s view of the matter. Indeed, the question presented is a purely legal one that is for a court to decide. We are obligated to disregard counsel’s concessions if they are incorrect.

II.

The district court admitted the documents into evidence under Fed.R.Evid. Rules 803(10) 1 and 902(3) 2 . The former rule is an exception to the hearsay exclusion. At trial, Regner contested its applicability to the document here in issue. That question is discussed at length infra. The latter rule affords a mechanism for the admission of public documents. Regner has not challenged its application in this case. 3

*761 In order to appreciate the applicability of Rule 803(10) to the documents, it is necessary also to understand the operation of Rules 803(6), 803(7), and 803(8). 4

A. Rules 803(6) and 803(8).

Both Rule 803(6) and Rule 803(8) allow the admission of what would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay testimony. 5 The former admits into evidence records of regularly conducted business activities. See, e.g., United States v. Sand, 541 F.2d 1370, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1103 , 97 S.Ct. 1130 , 51 L.Ed.2d 553 (1977) (bank records admitted against criminal defendants). The latter admits records of public offices or agencies. See, e.g., United States v. Hudson, 479 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1972), cert, denied, 414 U.S. 1012 , 94 S.Ct. 377 , 38 L.Ed.2d 250 (1973) (Selective Service file admitted as sole evidence sustaming criminal conviction). The difference in operation between the two is that 803(6) requires the “testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness,” J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Evidence 11803(6)[02] at 803-151 through -152 (1979), while 803(8) does not require any foundational testimony, id. f 803(8)[01] at 803-191.

B. Rules 803(7) and 803(10).

The existence of a record is evidence that the matter recorded therein occurred. When a duty to record certain matters exists, the non-existence of a record is evidence for the converse proposition, i.e. that the matter about which there is no report did not occur. See 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1633 at 624 (Chadbourn rev. 1974). The Federal Rules of Evidence 6 accordingly provide exceptions to the hearsay rule for *762 evidence showing the absence of business or public records. Rule 803(7) allows evidence of the nonoccurrence of a matter that would normally be recorded under 803(6), while Rule 803(10) allows such evidence with regard to what would ordinarily be recorded under 803(8). 7 Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 803(10) of Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 51 F.R.D. 315 , 431 (1971).

Since Rule 803(10) is based on Rule 803(8), evidence submitted thereunder need not be supported by testimony as to the nature of recordkeeping. Likewise, since 803(7) is based on 803(6), such testimony is required before evidence may be received thereunder. See 4 Weinstein’s Evidence, supra, 1803(7)[01] at 803-187. Cf. United States v. Rich, 580 F.2d 929, 938-39 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 935 , 99 S.Ct. 330 , 58 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978); United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1969) (Ely, J., concurring).

IV.

With the preceding understanding of the setting in which Rule 803(10) operates, I now consider the record from Fovarosi Autotaxi Vallalat, the state-owned taxicab company, introduced against defendant in this case.

In the American context, the records of a taxicab company would be admissible as business records under Rule 803(6) or 803(7). Cf. United States v. De Georgia, supra, 420 F.2d at 895-96 (business records admitted from auto rental company’s computer). They would not be admissible under 803(8) or 803(10), as they are not public records within the meaning of those rules.

The Hungarian People’s Republic and the United States of America enjoy markedly different political/economic systems. There is no overt distinction in Hungary between government’s acting in its official and the government’s acting in its proprietary capacities. Hungarian corporations are arms of the state; employees of corporations are to that extent government employees. The prosecution successfully urged below that because each cab driver in Budapest or Romand is an employee of the state, all taxi records are official records admissible under Rule 803(8) and 803(10). I cannot so blithely accept that syllogism.

A. Rule 803(10) Should Not Lightly Be Expanded.

Nothing in the language of or Advisory Committee Note to exceptions 803(6), 803(7), 803(8), or 803(10) indicates that their application to foreign documents was explicitly considered. Nonetheless, courts regularly admit foreign documents pursuant to these exceptions. Case-support exists for the admission under Rule 803(6) of foreign business documents, e.g., United States v. Sand, supra, 541 F.2d 1370, 1376-77 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 1103 , 97 S.Ct. 1130 , 51 L.Ed.2d 553 (1977) (Swiss bank records), the admission under Rule 803(8) of official foreign documents, e.g., United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) (records of Royal Ulster Constabulary); United States v. Rodriguez Serrate, 534 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1976) (Dominican identification card, birth certificate, military records, death certificate, passport records, and demographic registry); United States v. Pacheco-Lovio, 463 F.2d 232 (9th Cir. 1972) (Mexican birth certificate); United States v. Wing, 450 F.2d 806, 810-12 (9th Cir. 1971), cert, denied, 405 U.S. 994 , 92 S.Ct. 1267 , 31 L.Ed.2d 462 (1972) (Mexican government border documents); United States v. Ghaloub, 385 F.2d 567, 571 (2d Cir. 1966) (Syrian census records), and the admission of certifications by a foreign government that the official documents do not contain a specified record, e.g., United States v. D’Agostino, 338 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1964) (no record from Italian Registrar of Vital Statistics that marriage annulled); United States v. Blum, 329 F.2d 49 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 377 U.S. 993 , 84 S.Ct. 1920 , 12 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1964) (declaration that Swiss consular records contained no record of watch movements).

*763 The foregoing government document cases deal with foreign government action of an official rather than a proprietary nature. 8 The census reports, birth certificates, consular records, border documents, and other foreign documents admitted under Rules 803(8) and 803(10) would all be official documents even were they recorded in the American context. By contrast, the taxicab certificate of the instant case would not be considered official had it been prepared in the United States.

Past practices, therefore, indicate only that foreign documents which would be official documents if prepared in the United States are admissible under 803(8) or 803(10). No guidance with respect to the documents underlying Regner’s conviction — documents which would not be “official” if prepared here — is afforded by the case law.

Congress, however, has provided some guidance relevant to the disposition of this case. Because no witness subject to cross-examination need testify to the regularity of recordkeeping in the case of official records admitted under 803(8) or 803(10), it is difficult to attack the veracity of those records. That predicament may work unfair hardship to criminal defendants. Congress therefore expressed reluctance to use Rule 803(8) in criminal cases to expand pri- or practice concerning the public records hearsay exception. 4 Weinstein’s Evidence, supra, 1803(8)[01] at 803-189. Congress’ solicitude for the rights of criminal defendants is striking when the reluctance to expand 803(8), which admits public records, and hence the reluctance to expand 803(10), which admits evidence of the absence of a public record, is seen against the general background of Rule 803. The Rule is designed in all other respects to expand hearsay exceptions, id. 1803(6)[03] at 803-156.

Because acceptance of the taxicab record would require expansion of Rule 803(10), and because Congress has expressed a reluctance to expand Rule 803(10) against criminal defendants, the following discussion would hold the document inadmissible under that rule.

B. The Taxi Records Should Be Treated As Business Records.

The fact that in the Hungarian system taxi drivers are employees of the state need not, it seems to me, control decisions as to the admissibility of documents of the Hungarian taxicab company. The evidence rules distinguish between business records and public documents. It is not at all obvious to me that the policy of that distinction is served by blindly applying the label “public” to documents routinely generated by a commercial enterprise which happens to be “owned” by a foreign state.

The proponent of records from an American taxi company would have to present as a witness the company’s custodian of records or other qualified official to testify to the trustworthiness of the company’s recordkeeping. In the words of the Advisory Committee:

Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 803(6) of Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 51 F.R.D. 315 , 426-27 (1971). Had the prosecution furnished a witness to offer foundational testimony concerning the “systematic checking,” “regularity and continuity,” and “habits of precision” of the taxi records, there would have been no problem with admitting them into evidence.

But that course was not followed below. Rather, the prosecution offered the taxi documents as public records. The justification for the official records exemption from the hearsay rule “is the assumption that a public official will perform his duty properly and the unlikelihood that he will remember details independently of the record.” Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 803(8), id. at 429. In comparing this justification to that offered above for Rule 803(6), it appears that both business records and public records have high indicia of trustworthiness. 9 Nonetheless, the assurances of accuracy are usually greater for public records than for business entries. See 4 Weinstein’s Evidence, supra, 1803(8)[01] at 803-191. That disparity explains why official records can be admitted under Rule 803(8) without the subscribing testimony required for business records under Rule 803(6). See id.

Congress has directed that the Federal Rules of Evidence “be construed to secure ... development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.” Fed. R.Evid. 102. See United States v. Robinson, 544 F.2d 110, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1050 , 98 S.Ct. 901 , 54 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978). That goal would not be furthered here by admitting the taxicab records as official documents.

The most fitting label for a taxi company, be it communist or capitalist, American or Hungarian, is a business. Therefore, I am willing to presume that the Romand taxi driver performs his duty to file accident reports with no lesser punctiliousness than his Los Angeles counterpart and, accordingly, I would be prepared to admit the proffered document as a business record. But I cannot accept that the Romand taxi driver is so sure to perform his duty properly that no foundational testimony is needed to support the admission of documents against an American criminal defendant, at the same time that the rules of evidence do not place similar confidence in the Los Angeles taxi driver. In short, I am not satisfied, in the absence of testimony from any Hungarian custodian of records, that the assurances of accuracy are greater for these “public” records than they would be for Los Angeles taxi records.

I would hold that the district court committed error in admitting those records under 803(10).

C. The Error in Admitting the Taxi Records as Official Records Requires Reversal.

Had the taxi certificate been properly admitted under 803(7), rather than improperly under 803(10), foundational testimony would have been required. See 4 Weinstein’s Evidence, supra, 1803(7)[01] at 803-187. The failure to offer such testimony is grounds for excluding the evidence. See N. L. R. B. v. First Termite Control Co., Inc., 646 F.2d 424, 427-30 (9th Cir. 1981). In First Termite Control, even though a witness testified in support of the challenged document’s admission, her insufficient knowledge concerning recordkeeping rendered cross-examination meaningless. The document was therefore inadmissible and the judgment consequently could not stand.

In order to determine whether an error in a criminal proceeding is harmless or demands reversal, we apply the standards formulated in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). See United States v. Ford, 632 F.2d 1354 , 1375 n.22 (9th Cir. 1980), cert, denied, 450 U.S. 934 , 101 S.Ct. 1399 , 67 L.Ed.2d 369 *765 (1981); Bushaw v. United States, 353 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1965), cert, denied, 384 U.S. 921 , 86 S.Ct. 1371 , 16 L.Ed.2d 441 (1966). Kotteakos demands reversal in this case if we are left with “grave doubt” as to whether the erroneous admission of the taxicab record had a “substantial influence” on the verdict or if we cannot say “with fair assurance ... that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.” 328 U.S. at 765 , 66 S.Ct. at 1248 . Application of those standards to the instant case mandates reversal of Regner’s conviction.

The preceding section demonstrates that the taxicab record was improperly admitted into evidence. The only remaining evidence concerning the occurrence or non-occurrence of the alleged automobile accident is Regner’s uncontroverted assertion that the accident took place. No evidence remains from which the jury could have inferred that Regner misrepresented the fact that he was involved in an automobile accident.

It is true that even after striking the taxicab document, the record still would contain evidence that Regner had his agent send to his insurance company a hospital bill for services performed not on Regner but on his stepson. Moreover, to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 , the Government need prove only one act of wilful misrepresentation. United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir. 1981). Nonetheless, Regner’s conviction should not be affirmed on this basis. The gravamen of the indictment against Regner was not that Regner mailed an erroneous hospital bill, but rather that Regner “falsely represented [that his medical expenses] were caused by an automobile accident in Hungary.” The five subcounts of the indictment make repeated references to the allegation that the automobile accident was fictitious. These subcounts mention the allegedly false representation of hospitalization only once, and then only in conjunction with the charge of falsifying the automobile accident.

Accordingly, even if sending an erroneous hospital bill to one’s insurance company could qualify as mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 , I am far from confident that this issue was fully presented to the jury or that the jury could have reached a judgment on that basis. 10 The evidence remaining in the record after striking the erroneously admitted taxicab record would indicate that Regner had been involved in an automobile accident, had been treated by a doctor subsequent thereto, and had sent his insurance company his stepson’s hospital bill rather than his own medical bill. This evidence, though consistent with a scheme to defraud, is also consistent with an innocent mistake. Accordingly, I cannot be confident that the jury would have found that Regner acted with criminal intent, a finding requisite to conviction under § 1341. See United States v. Beecroft, 608 F.2d 753, 757 (9th Cir. 1979); Bolen v. United States, 303 F.2d 870, 875 (9th Cir. 1962).

The standards enumerated in Kotteakos, supra, preclude a finding that the error in admitting the taxicab record was harmless. Cf. Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 1981) (admission of document under business document exception was reversible error, and court did not need to decide whether substantial evidence supported the verdict); Lindsey v. Craven, 521 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1975).

V.

The Supreme Court has recognized that the Confrontation Clause operates in two separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. First, the Sixth Amend *766 ment establishes a rule of necessity that requires face-to-face confrontation — the sine qua non for cross-examination — except where the hearsay declarant is unavailable. Second, the Confrontation Clause continues to operate once it has been demonstrated that the witness is unavailable. “Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence, the Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that ‘there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule.’ ” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 , 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539 , 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 101 , 54 S.Ct. 330 , 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934).

Before the testimony of an unavailable witness can be admitted, it must possess “indicia of reliability.” As Roberts explains,

448 U.S. at 66 , 100 S.Ct. at 2539 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In the present case no hearsay declarant was available for defendant to cross-examine. Therefore, only if the evidence admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule demonstrated “indicia of reliability” would there be no material departure from the reason of the Confrontation Clause.

First, this is not a case where reliability can be inferred because the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. As I have already explained in Part IV above, the hearsay exception codified in Rule 803(10) does not apply to the certification used in this case to prove that Mr. Regner’s alleged taxicab accident never occurred.

Second, the very way in which the evidence was admitted precluded a showing of “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” The recordkeeping procedures of the Hungarian taxicab service were unknown to the district court, and are unknown to this court. Relevant information about those procedures could have been obtained through the testimony, subject to cross-examination, of a custodian of the records or other qualified witness. Yet Regner was denied an opportunity to cross-examine a witness familiar with the company’s records.

It must be remembered that no record was produced of Regner’s having been in a taxi accident. Rather, a document was submitted into evidence certifying that no such record exists. It was thus vitally important for Regner to ascertain what recordkeeping and search techniques the Hungarian taxi company followed. For if he could have demonstrated lapses in its system, he might have reconciled the absence of any record with the occurrence of the alleged accident. Regner had need of an opportunity to demonstrate that the recordation procedures of the Fovarosi Autotaxi Vallalat were inadequate, cf. United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789, 794 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 442 U.S. 920 , 99 S.Ct. 2845 , 61 L.Ed.2d 288 (1979); Gibbs v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 544 F.2d 423, 428 (9th Cir. 1976), or that a diligent search of its records was not appropriately undertaken, cf. United States v. Robinson, supra, 544 F.2d 110, 114-15 (2d Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 434 U.S. 1050 , 98 S.Ct. 901 , 54 L.Ed.2d 803 (1978).

I conclude that the unwarranted expansion of a hearsay exception, used in this case to admit evidence lacking indicia of *767-771 reliability, violated the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause.

VI.

The taxicab certificate introduced against Regner qualified for admission only as a business record under Fed.R.Evid. 803(7) and the foundational testimony required by that Rule was lacking. Moreover, in this case, the admission of hearsay evidence that lacked the necessary indicia of reliability violated defendant’s right of confrontation. On these two grounds I would reverse defendant’s conviction and remand to the district court.

. For the text of Rule 803(10), see Majority Opinion, ante, at note 2.

. For the text of Rule 902(a), see Majority Opinion, ante, at note 2.

. Two points must nonetheless be made about Fed.R.Evid. 902(3). First, it is derived from Fed.R.Civ.P. 44(a)(2). See Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 902(3) of Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 51 F.R.D. 315 , 454 (1971). That fact proves important to many of the cases in succeeding sections which arise under Fed.R.Civ.P. 44(a)(2).

Second, compliance with Rule 902(3) will shortly no longer be necessary because the United States has recently ratified by treaty the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalization for Foreign Public Documents. See J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 5 Weinstein’s Evidence U 902(3a)[01] at 28 (1980 Supp.).

. Rules 803(6), 803(7), and 803(8) provide as follows:

The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:

******

(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the Course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term “business” as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.

(7) Absence of entry in records kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6). Evidence that a matter is not included in the memoranda reports, records, or data compilations, in any form, kept in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (6), to prove the nonoccurrence or nonexistence of the matter, if the matter was of a kind of which a memorandum, report, record, or data compilation was regularly made and preserved, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

. Rules 803(6) and 803(8) are reproduced in footnote 1, supra. Rule 803(6) derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1732 . See Advisory Committee’s Note to Rule 803(6) of Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 51 F.R.D. 315 , 426 (1971). Rule 803(8) is an expansion upon 28 U.S.C. § 1733 . See J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 4 Weinstein’s Evidence f 803(8)[01] at 803-190 (1979).

. Even before the Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted, this circuit allowed the hearsay exceptions later codified as Rules 803(7) and 803(10). See United States v. De Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 892-94 (9th Cir. 1969), overruling Shreve v. United States, 77 F.2d 2, 7 (9th Cir. 1935), cert, denied, 296 U.S. 654 , 56 S.Ct. 380 , 80 L.Ed. 466 (1936).

. Rule 803(7) is reproduced in note 4, supra. For the text of Rule 803(10), see Majority Opinion, ante, at note 2.

. The distinction between government acting in its proprietary and its sovereign capacities is well settled in the law, although it has not escaped criticism. E.g., Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 , 644 & n.26, 100 S.Ct. 1398 , 1412 & n.26, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980). As far back as 1824, Chief Justice Marshall stated:

Bank of the United States v. Planters’ Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 904, 907, 6 L.Ed. 244 (1824). See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695-96 , 96 S.Ct. 1854, 1861-62 , 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976) (Opinion of White, J.) (collecting citations).

This court has relied on the distinction while recognizing its limitations. See United States v. Georgia-Pacific Co., 421 F.2d 92 , 100 & n.17 (9th Cir. 1970).

. However, even if all other formal requirements are met, both 803(6) and 803(8) nonetheless exclude records if the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.

. Once again, the standard for reversible error set forth in Kotteakos is pertinent:

328 U.S. at 765 , 66 S.Ct. at 1248 . I am troubled that the majority has overlooked the Kotteakos standard in concluding that even if no Confrontation Clause violation were present, sufficient evidence existed to support the jury’s verdict. Although evidence may have existed to support the jury’s verdict, I am hardly convinced that that evidence was the basis for the jury’s verdict. Because inadmissible evidence may well have infected the verdict, I would hold, in light of the Kotteakos standard, that there was reversible error.