United States v. Rebecca Ann Smith, United States of America v. Clifford Rickard Arthur

These consolidated appeals, both arising in the District of Oregon, present the question whether a “split sentence” is lawful under the Youth Corrections Act [“YCA”], 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005 — 26, and, if so, whether the offender must be segregated from adults during confinement.

The appellant in No. 80-1380, Rebecca Ann Smith, was indicted in February 1980 *1237 on one count of embezzling funds from the federally-insured bank where she worked, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 656 . She entered a guilty plea, and was sentenced under the YCA, 18 U.S.C. § 5010 (a). (Smith was twenty years old at the time of sentencing.) She received a five-year sentence, but on condition that she be “confined in a jail-type setting” for forty-five days, 1 execution of the remainder of the sentence was suspended and Smith was placed on five years’ probation.

The appellant in No. 80-1479, Clifford Rickard Arthur, was indicted in March 1980 on one count of stealing two bicycles on the Warm Springs Indian Reservation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1153 and 661. He entered a guilty plea, and was sentenced under the YCA. 2 (Arthur was nineteen years old at the time of sentencing.) He received a three-year sentence,…

joins, dissenting:

Congress has told federal judges that youths who are entitled to probation under the Youth Corrections Act may not be put in jail as a condition precedent to receiving probation. I therefore dissent.

The majority holds that “split sentences, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3651 , are permissible under the YCA.” This conclusion follows from the premise that “courts sentencing youth offenders are meant to enjoy whatever powers are conferred by section 3651 as amended since 1950.”

It must be assumed that the majority’s abstraction, “courts are meant to enjoy,” is a reference to a legislative act of Congress — that Congress granted the undefined and potentially limitless sentencing power referred to, when it enacted the YCA in 1950. Thus stated, the proposition is wrong.

The majority holds that Congress wrote a blank check in 1950 that would allow expansion of sentencing options under the YCA independently of the policies, or indeed the express limitations, of the YCA, by future amendments to a different statute. That different statute is the general probation statute, which did not provide for split sentences until 1958. Indeed, the majority concludes that, in…

683 F.2d 1236 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Rebecca Ann SMITH, Defendant-Appellant. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clifford Rickard ARTHUR, Defendant-Appellant. Nos. 80-1380, 80-1479. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Dec. 18, 1981. Decided Aug. 10, 1982. Mark E. Griffin, Agana, Guam, for Smith and Arthur. Sidney I. Lezak, U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., for United States; Charles Turner, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Or., on brief. Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. Before BROWNING, CHOY, WALLACE, KENNEDY, ANDERSON, SKOPIL, PREGERSON, POOLE, FERGUSON, CANBY and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges. PREGERSON, Circuit Judge: 1 These consolidated appeals, both arising in the District of Oregon, present the question whether a "split sentence" is lawful under the Youth Corrections Act ("YCA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 , and, if so, whether the offender must be segregated from adults during confinement. 2 The appellant in No. 80-1380, Rebecca Ann Smith, was indicted in February 1980 on one count of embezzling funds from the federally-insured bank where she worked, in violation of 18…