Steven G. Cummings v. United States of America, Allstate Insurance Company, a Corporation, Applicant-Plaintiff in Intervention-Appellant

The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Allstate’s motion to intervene in the tort action brought by its insured, Steven Cummings, against the United States. 1 After a collision between Cummings’ automobile and a Postal Service vehicle, both Cummings and Allstate filed administrative claims for damages. Cummings’ claim sought $5,521.92 for property damage, $50,-000.00 for personal injury, and $470.00 for rental of a replacement car. Allstate’s claim sought approximately $5,000 which it had either paid or anticipated that it would be obligated to pay by virtue of its role as Cummings’ auto insurance carrier. The Postal Service denied both administrative claims. Cummings then filed a complaint under the Federal Tort Claims Act seeking damages of $55,991.92, an amount equalling his claims for property damage, personal injury, and car rental expenses. Cummings’ legal complaint was timely filed on September 14, 1979, within six months of the denial of his administrative claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) (1976). Allstate, the insurer, did not file a similar legal action, nor join in Cummings’ action at that time. *439 On May 20, 1980,…

dissenting.

I am uncomfortable with Judge Boochever’s proposed disposition of the case and believe that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying as untimely Allstate’s motion for intervention. Fed.R. Civ.P. 24(a) requires that a motion to intervene be timely made. Allstate was well aware of the pendency of the action from its inception and had in fact filed an administrative claim. There was no excuse for moving to intervene sooner. Its motion came three days after the cutoff date for interrogatories and less than six weeks before the final discovery cutoff date. The admission of a new party at the winding-down stages of discovery in litigation can have very serious consequences to the court’s effort to get to a determination and trial judges ought to have wide latitude in the control and management of their cases.

While it may be that the motion was not absolutely barred by expiration of the limitations period, as appellant contends, there are many other considerations involved and we should be slow to rule that a district judge has abused discretion in denying so tardy a motion to intervene when he believes that intervention would delay or distort the case.…

704 F.2d 437 Steven G. CUMMINGS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee. Allstate Insurance Company, a Corporation, Applicant-Plaintiff in Intervention-Appellant. No. 80-5624. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted July 9, 1982. Decided April 18, 1983. William R. Hose, Jr., Hose & Decker, Downey, Cal., for applicant plaintiff in intervention-appellant. William B. Spivak, Jr., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California. Before ALARCON, POOLE, and BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judges. BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge: 1 The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Allstate's motion to intervene in the tort action brought by its insured, Steven Cummings, against the United States. 1 After a collision between Cummings' automobile and a Postal Service vehicle, both Cummings and Allstate filed administrative claims for damages. Cummings' claim sought $5,521.92 for property damage, $50,000.00 for personal injury, and $470.00 for rental of a replacement car. Allstate's claim sought approximately $5,000 which it had either…