concurring.

I join the majority because I believe the result is required by the holding of the California Supreme Court in Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal.3d 741 , 614 P.2d 728 , 167 Cal.Rptr. 70 (1980). Because I recognize that we must follow Thompson in this diversity action, I take issue not with the majority opinion but with Thompson , which enunciates a myopic view of foreseeability in the context of the duty to warn and to supervise.

In Thompson , the California court distinguished Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 , 447 P.2d 352 , 73 Cal.Rptr. 240 (1968) and Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 17 Cal.3d 425 , 551 P.2d 334 , 131 Cal.Rptr. 14 (1976), the two leading cases in which an affirmative duty to protect a third party from another was found. In Johnson, 69 Cal.2d at 784-85 , 447 P.2d at 354 , 73 Cal. Rptr. at 242 , the state placed a minor with “homicidal tendencies and a background of violence and cruelty” in a foster home without warning the foster parent. The minor attacked the foster parent and she sued the state. Id. The court held, “As the party placing the youth with Mrs. Johnson, the state’s relationship to plaintiff was such that its duty extended to warning of latent, dangerous qualities suggested by the parolee’s history or character.” Id. at 785, 447 P.2d at 355 , 73 Cal.Rptr. at 243 .

In Tarasoff, 17 Cal.3d at 430 , 551 P.2d at 339-40 , 131 Cal.Rptr. at 19-20 , the Tara-soffs alleged that the killer of their daughter had confided to his therapist his specific intention to kill her. There, the court relied not only on the unique fact of a named victim to find a duty, but also on the plaintiff’s showing of a special relationship between the killer and the therapist. Id. at 436 , 551 P.2d at 343 , 131 Cal.Rptr. at 23 .

In Thompson, 27 Cal.3d at 746 , 614 P.2d at 730 , 167 Cal.Rptr. at 72 , a juvenile offender, released temporarily from a county institution to his mother, murdered a neighbor’s child within 24 hours of his release. The Thompsons alleged that the county knew of the juvenile’s violent and dangerous impulses towards children and that the juvenile had “indicated that he would, if released, take the life of a young child in the neighborhood.” Id. However, under these facts, the court held that no duty to warn existed because the plaintiffs had alleged neither the “direct or continuing relationship” between them and the county which existed in Johnson, nor that their decedent was a “foreseeable or readily identifiable target” of the offender’s threats as in Tarasoff. Thompson, 27 Cal.3d at 753 , 614 P.2d at 734 , 167 Cal.Rptr. at 76 .

As recognized by Justice Tobriner, the author of both the Johnson and Tarasoff opinions, the Thompson majority misread the controlling precedent to fashion an overly restrictive concept of foreseeability:

Id. at 760-61, 614 P.2d at 739-40 , 167 Cal. Rptr. at 81-82 (Tobriner, J., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted; emphasis in the original).

Applying the Tarasoff principles to the facts here, it is obvious that a special relationship exists between Singer and the corps members who victimized the Vus. 1 Thus, the inquiry is whether the Vus were foreseeable victims. The evidence shows: (1) that the Vus lived between the Job Corps Center and a nearby park, a Job Corps “hang .out” that the Center placed off-limits because of the drinking and fighting that occurred there, see Vu v. Singer, 538 F.Supp. 26, 28 (N.D.Cal.1981); (2) after the park was placed off limits it was patrolled by Job Corps security, id.; (3) the corps members who attacked and robbed Mrs. Vu had been involved repeatedly in alcohol and drug abuse, assaults and thefts while at the Center, id. at 30 & nn. 3-5; and (4) the attack occurred while the corps members were en route from the park to the Center. Id. at 28 . Clearly, under Tarasoff , the question whether the Vus, as residents of the area between the Job Corps Center and the park, were foreseeable victims presents at least a triable issue of fact. See Thompson, 27 Cal.3d at 761 , 614 P.2d at 740 , 167 Cal.Rptr. at 82 (Tobriner, J., dissenting); Buford v. State, 104 Cal.App.3d 811, 824 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 264, 272 (1980).

The district court, however, was forced to conclude here that, under Thompson , the Vus were not foreseeable victims as a matter of law. Vu, 538 F.Supp. at 31 . The court reasoned that Thompson requires a specifically identifiable victim — more specific than the class of neighborhood children threatened in Thompson —before a duty to warn may now arise in California. The court applied this reasoning to the “duty to control” alleged by the Vus, concluding “that no duty arises to protect unforeseeable victims from third persons, by warning or supervision, because the burden of imposing liability upon a defendant for a third person’s actions is too onerous without the foreseeability limitation.” Id. at n. 7.

As recognized by Justice Tobriner in Thompson , the consideration of whether the Vus are “identifiable victims” is relevant not to the existence of a duty of care, but only to the question whether a warning to the Vus might have been a reasonable means to discharge that duty. Thompson, 27 Cal.3d at 761 , 614 P.2d at 740 , 167 Cal. Rptr. at 82 (Tobriner, J., dissenting). The application of such a requirement here to a duty to control follows logically from Thompson , but nonetheless compounds the Thompson court’s error in reasoning because it permits a “means” consideration to dictate the existence of a duty of care. The district court’s implicit recognition that increased supervision of the corps members might well have been more effective here than warning the neighborhood underscores this error. See Vu, 538 F.Supp. at 31 n. 7.

Justice Tobriner also provides sound criticism applicable to the reliance, by both the district court and the majority, on Beau-chene v. Synanon Foundation, Inc., 88 Cal. App.3d 342, 347-48 , 151 Cal.Rptr. 796, 798-99 (1979). Beauchene is cited to show that public policy considerations also defeat the finding of a duty of care in this case. As Justice Tobriner noted in Thompson , in *1033 which Beauchene was also cited, the policy underlying the plaintiff’s cause of action was ignored by the majority. Thompson, 27 Cal.3d at 763 , 614 P.2d at 741 , 167 Cal.Rptr. at 83 (Tobriner, J., dissenting).

That policy includes the principle, embodied in California statute, of compensating victims of negligence in order to recompense their injury and to deter future negligence. Id. (citations omitted). “Consequently,” as Justice Tobriner stated, “ ‘[ujnless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity, the important societal goal of compensating injured parties for damages caused by willful or negligent acts must prevail.’ ” Id. (citations omitted). These precepts should outweigh any anxiety that the California legislature erred in not immunizing privately operated rehabilitation programs.

. Such a relationship arguably exists even between Singer and the Vus by' virtue of the continuous and close proximity of the Job Corps Center to the Vu home. The Thompson court’s characterization of that relationship, however, effectively limits this relationship to the facts of Johnson. See Thompson, 27 Cal.3d at 751 , 614 P.2d at 733 , 167 Cal.Rptr. at 75 (relationship with specific victim).