Williams appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. He argues that the Parole Commission erred in reopening his presumptive parole date because there was no “new adverse information,” and, in the alternative, that the Parole Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in setting his new presumptive parole date. We affirm.

*1061 I. The Facts.

Williams is a federal prisoner confined in a California state prison at San Quentin, to which he was transferred from the federal penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, because his life was believed to be in danger in that penitentiary. He is in a special protective custody unit at San Quentin. He is also serving a Texas sentence concurrently, for which a detainer is lodged against him.

In August 1977 Williams was involved in a prison killing at the federal penitentiary in Atlanta. Pursuant to a plea bargain, he testified at the trial of the principals, and pled guilty to one count charging him with being an accessory after the fact. On December 20,1978, he was sentenced to a term of eight years, consecutive to the other sentence that he was serving.

The sentencing judge executed a standard parole comment form. The judge checked the box on the form indicating that “Parole should be granted at a time best determined by the Parole Board.” He did not check the option stating “Unless there is an extraordinary change of character, parole, for the protection of the community, should be denied.” On the portion of the form for a judge’s comments, the judge stated: “This man cooperated and was a government witness; however, the court is of the opinion his cooperation was to save himself from a prosecution for murder. He was given consideration for this by being prosecuted for accessory rather than the crime of murder. The record is of [sic] such that the court is of the opinion that at the present time he would be a danger to society.”

Following its standard practice, the Bureau of Prisons aggregated Williams’ sentences to determine his parole eligibility. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.2 , 2.5; 18 U.S.C. §§ 4161 , 4205(a). Williams had been eligible for parole since 1973, but parole had not been granted. See 18 U.S.C. § 4206 (a); 28 C.F.R. § 2.18 . His sentences aggregate 39 years.

Williams’ first parole hearing was held March 15, 1979. The hearing examiners had before them some sources of information regarding Williams’ involvement in the Atlanta prison killing, including Williams’ own report and a letter from the prosecutor in the prison killing case. It is not clear from the record whether the pre-sentence report relating to the Atlanta conviction was before the examiners, but it is clear that the judge’s parole comment form was not before them. The examiners recommended that Williams’ presumptive parole date be set for December 15, 1980, subject to the Texas detainer, and, if that were withdrawn, for January 15, 1981.

The prosecutor’s letter stated that there was a plea bargain and that Williams had cooperated. It did not state that Williams pled guilty to avoid a charge of murder, although this might be inferred from the fact that there was a plea bargain.

We do not know what was in the pre-sentence report, because it is not in the record. We do know the conclusions reached by the hearing examiners at the March 15, 1979 hearing. We quote them rather fully because they contrast so sharply with the trial judge’s view.

Williams sent a pro se request for a reduction of sentence to the sentencing judge, in which he mentioned his presumptive parole date. The judge denied Williams’ request and directed Atlanta United States Probation Officer Salter to write to the Parole Commission to express the judge’s dissatisfaction. Salter wrote the letter on April 26, 1979. With it, he sent a copy of the parole comment and a copy of the presentence report. In the letter, Salter said:

After receipt of Salter’s letter by the Commission, a case analyst for the Commission summarized the case for Commissioner Kaslow, and stated:

The case was reopened on May 23, 1979. The next day, Probation Officer Salter wrote another letter to the Commission, stating more fully his reasons for suggesting a later parole date. Here is part of what the letter says.

Williams’ special reconsideration hearing was held July 2,1979. The hearing examiners considered several sources of information regarding the prison killing received after the reopening, as well as the parole comment form and the probation officer’s letter. These examiners recommended the same presumptive parole date as had been set after the first hearing. The hearing officers also concluded that there was insufficient new information on which to change their recommendation.

Pursuant to 28 C.F.R. § 2.24 (a), a Regional Commissioner reviewed the hearing examiners’ conclusion and disagreed with the local decision. The case was referred to the National Commissioners with a recommended parole date of January 15, 1989. The National Commissioners finally adopted a presumptive parole date of April 14, 1986.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Williams filed his federal habeas corpus petition. The district court dismissed the petition, finding that the sentencing judge’s opinion as to the early parole date was new adverse information. The court also found that the reopening was valid on the basis of information received after the reopening.

II. Discussion.

A. Standard of Review.

The decisions of the Parole Commission are committed to its sound discretion. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4218 (d), 4203(b). A court should not override the judgment of the Commission unless it has abused its discretion. O’Brien v. Putnam, 9 Cir., 1979, 591 F.2d 53, 55 .

The Commission has broad powers to implement the statutory provisions for parole. 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (a)(1). Comprehensive regulations govern the procedures to be followed. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.60 (1981). The Commission’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to deference, unless the interpretation is shown to be plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Udall v. Tallman, 1965, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 , 85 S.Ct. 792, 801-02 , 13 L.Ed.2d 616 . The administrative construction given a regulation must be reasonable and consistent with the governing statutes and other relevant regulations. See McClanahan v. Mulcrome, 10 Cir., 1980, 636 F.2d 1190, 1191 .

*1064 An appellate court’s examination of the district court's review of Parole Commission action includes a determination of whether the district court correctly applied proper legal principles in examining the record and whether the record contained adequate supporting material. Zannino v. Arnold, 3 Cir., 1976, 531 F.2d 687, 691 .

We deal here with a reopening after the setting of a presumptive parole date. As “presumptive” shows, the date is not final, but subject to change. Thus, cases such as Ready v. United States Parole Commission, M.D.Pa., 1980, 483 F.Supp. 1273 , which deals with a final parole date, rather than a presumptive parole date, are not in point here. The difference between rescission of an effective parole date and reopening to reconsider a presumptive parole date is sufficient to warrant a less stringent rule for reopening than for rescission. Accordingly, we do not adopt the strict “preclusion” rule of Ready here.

B. New Adverse Information.

A presumptive parole date is conditional, and is subject to reopening under 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 . 28 C.F.R. § 2.12 (d) (1982). Section 2.28(f) provides, in pertinent part:

“New and significant adverse information” is not defined in the regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.1 (i).

1. Sentencing judge’s expectations for parole.

In Izsak v. Sigler, 9 Cir., 1979, 604 F.2d 1205 , the appellant argued that the sentencing judge had intended an early parole date, and that denial of parole frustrated the intention of the sentencing judge. We denied that claim, relying on United States v. Addonizio, 1979, 442 U.S. 178 , 99 S.Ct. 2235 , 60 L.Ed.2d 805 , 604 F.2d at 1207-1208 . In Addonizio , the Supreme Court stated:

442 U.S. at 190 , 99 S.Ct. at 2243 .

In light of these decisions, it would be improper to hold that the sentencing judge’s dissatisfaction with a presumptive parole date can be “new and significant adverse information.” As noted by the Court in Addonizio , the enforceable expectations of a sentencing judge for a particular release date are severely limited by statute. Id. at 189 & n. 15, 99 S.Ct. at 2242 & n. 15. The statute provides that the recommendation of the sentencing judge “made at the time of sentencing” (emphasis added) shall be considered by the Commission if available and relevant. 18 U.S.C. § 4207 . See also 28 C.F.R. § 2.19 (a). The statute and regulations indicate that other substantial information may be considered by the Commission but place restrictions on such information to assure accuracy and relevance to the statutory criteria for parole. See 28 C.F.R. § 2.19 (b), (c), (d).

2. Parole comment form.

The district court found that the sentencing judge’s parole comment form was new adverse information because it was not available or not considered by the hearing examiners at the initial parole hearing. We agree.

*1065 It is critical to our view of this case that the information that the hearing examiners failed initially to consider was the sentencing judge’s parole comment form. As we have seen, both the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (4), and the regulation, 28 C.F.R. § 2.19 (a)(4), require the Commission to consider the sentencing judge’s comments regarding parole. When, as here, the Commission’s hearing examiners are unaware of the contents or existence of this form when making their initial presumptive parole date determination, we think it entirely proper for the Regional Commissioner to reopen so that the sentencing comments can receive proper consideration. In our view the sentencing judge’s opinion at the time of sentencing is itself a significant “fact” that the Commission’s hearing examiners ought to consider. The importance of the judge’s recommendation is indicated by the fact that the statute and regulations both expressly require it to be considered.

Thus, it is not an answer to say that the examiners had before them substantially the same information as the parole comment form contained. It is not at all clear that they did, but assuming that they did, they did not do what the statute and regulations require — consider the “recommendations regarding the prisoner’s parole made at the time of sentencing by the sentencing judge.” 18 U.S.C. § 4207 (4).

Neither is it an answer to say that, because the parole comment form and presentenee report were sent to the Bureau of Prisons, which is what the record shows, we must hold that there is no excuse for the Commission’s failure to consider them, and therefore the Commission cannot consider the parole comment form when it is brought to the Commission’s attention.

We refuse to adopt an ironclad rule that the Commission can never reopen a case under Section 2.28(f) on the basis of a document that is in its file, but which has not in fact been considered by the examiners in making their parole decision. On the other hand, we go only so far here as to say that an item as important as the sentencing judge’s recommendation, one that is statutorily required to be considered, may in a proper case serve as a basis for reopening. Here, the sentencing judge’s recommendation was not before the examiners at the time of hearing and could have substantially affected the parole decision.

The Parole Commission has nationwide jurisdiction. It blinks reality to hold that papers such as the trial judge’s parole comment and pre-sentence report, sent to the Bureau of Prisons by a judge and a probation officer in Atlanta, must have been in, or must be deemed to have been in, the file of the Regional Commission in Burlingame, California, and therefore before the examiners who conducted the first hearing at San Quentin prison in California. Williams, a federal prisoner, was in that prison only to protect him from being killed by fellow inmates if he were to remain in the federal prison in Atlanta. It could easily happen that papers concerning him, sent to the Bureau, never got to the California office of the Commission until Probation Officer Salter sent them with his April 26, 1979 letter.

The Commission is not a court, and is not required to act like a court. We should not hog tie it by overtechnical construction of the statutes and the regulations. The Commission’s construction and application of them should be upheld unless they are obviously wrong.

It seems clear from the record that, at the first hearing, the Commission examiners swallowed Williams’ version of the murder because they did not have any other information before them. When the Regional Commissioner received the sentencing judge’s parole comment, she recommended reopening and the Commission voted to reopen. We hold that she had power to recommend, and that the Commission had power to reopen. McClanahan v. Mulcrome, 10 Cir., 1980, 636 F.2d 1190 , is in point. There the court noted that the regulation, then 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 , now § 2.28(f), refers to the receipt of new and significant information by the Regional Commissioner. It held:

636 F.2d at 1191 .

As Judge Henderson, the habeas corpus judge, said in his order denying the writ:

3. Information received after reopening.

The district court held that other documents, received by the Commission after the decision to reopen, independently support the reopening of Williams’ parole date. We do not consider whether this was a proper holding because we have held that the sentencing judge’s parole comment form was “new and significant adverse information” justifying reopening under 28 C.F.R. § 2.28 (f). Once the presumptive parole date was reopened, the Commission was authorized by 28 C.F.R. § 2.19 to consider all of the additional documents. At the reopening hearing, the Commission was entitled to take remedial action based in part upon the new information. It certainly did not abuse its discretion, nor did it misconstrue its own regulation.

We find no merit in Williams’ attack on the April 14, 1986 date finally fixed by the Commission. The Commission did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in setting the new parole date. See Reynolds v. McCall, 9 Cir., 1983, 701 F.2d 810, 813-814 .

Affirmed.