Freddy Curiel v. Amy Miller

Concurrence by Judge REINHARDT;

Concurrence by Judge BYBEE

OPINION

This case concerns the timeliness of Freddy Curiel’s federal habeas petition under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). We hold that the district court erred in dismissing Curiel’s habeas petition as untimely.

*867 BACKGROUND

In March 2006, a California jury convicted Curiel of special circumstances first-degree murder and street terrorism. Cu-riel was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus twenty-five years.

Curiel appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed, and to the California Supreme Court, which denied his petition for review on June 11, 2008. Curiel’s conviction became final on September 9, 2008, after the time for Curiel to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court lapsed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(1)(A).

On May 12, 2009, 1 Curiel initiated a collateral attack on his conviction by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Orange County Superior Court. The court denied his petition on June 10, 2009, on the “separate and independent grounds” that it was untimely and that…

concurring:

I concur fully in Judge Murguia’s opinion for the court. I also agree generally with Judge Bybee that our decision-making would be aided significantly if the California Supreme Court were to explain more clearly the basis for its summary denials. Even more important, I would urge the California Supreme Court to specify in its opinions whether it is deciding on the merits any or all of the questions of federal constitutional law that are raised in the case before it, and identify the constitutional basis of all such claims that it is denying, if any.

I write separately, however, to urge the California Supreme Court to take a slightly different approach to questions of federal constitutional law in view of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court that have placed an almost impossible burden on state courts: to be the final decision-maker in an overwhelming number of cases involving fundamental constitutional rights of criminal defendants. Although recognizing that the California Supreme Court “disposes of close to 10,000 cases a year, including more than 3,400 original habeas corpus petitions,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 , 131 S.Ct. 770 , 178…

concurring:

I was a member of the three-judge panel that was first assigned this case. There, I joined the panel’s decision that reached a different result from the one we reach as an en banc court today. See Curiel v. Miller, 780 F.3d 1201 , vacated 798 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 2015). Upon further reflection, I now find our decision here to be more consistent with Supreme Court precedent, with how our court has previously analyzed summary denials of habeas petitions by California state courts, and with the interpretive signals that the California Supreme Court has flashed in the past. Accordingly, I concur in Judge Murguia’s opinion for the court in full.

I

I write separately to express my frustration that communication between the California Supreme Court and our court over the proper interpretation of California state habeas decisions has devolved into a series of hints that the California Supreme Court obliquely telegraphs and that we struggle to decipher. Unfortunately, I am not voicing an original or unique complaint — our court has been making its concerns with California’s habeas practice known for the better part of half a century. See Castro v. Klinger, 373 F.2d 847, 850…

BACKGROUND

In March 2006, a California jury convicted Curiel of special circumstances first-degree murder and street terrorism. Curiel was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus twenty-five years.

Curiel appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeal, which affirmed, and to the California Supreme Court, which denied his petition for review on June 11, 2008. Curiel’s conviction became final on September 9, 2008, after the time for Curiel to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court lapsed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).

On May 12, 2009,1 Curiel initiated a collateral attack on his conviction by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus

1 All of the filing dates reflect the constructive filing date of the petition in accordance with the “mailbox rule,” which provides that a habeas petition is deemed filed when the prisoner delivers it to prison authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the court, not when the petition is filed by the court. Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 996 n.1 (9th Cir. 2009). The parties agree that the mailbox rule applies and do not contest the relevant dates.

CURIEL V. MILLER …