Sandquist

Filed 7/28/

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA

TIMOTHY SANDQUIST, )

) Plaintiff and Appellant, ) ) S220812 v. ) ) Ct.App. 2/7 B244412 LEBO AUTOMOTIVE, INC., et al., ) ) Los Angeles County Defendants and Respondents. ) Super. Ct. No. BC476523 ____________________________________)

Plaintiff Timothy Sandquist and the various defendants here are parties to an arbitration agreement. A salient question is whether that agreement permits or prohibits arbitration on a classwide basis. Here we must answer a question one step removed—who decides whether the agreement permits or prohibits classwide arbitration, a court or the arbitrator? The question has divided the many state and federal courts to consider it. We conclude no universal rule allocates this decision in all cases to either arbitrators or courts. Rather, who decides is in the first instance a matter of agreement, with the parties‘ agreement subject to interpretation under state contract law. Under state law, these parties‘ arbitration agreement allocates the decision to the arbitrator.…

Plaintiff Timothy Sandquist and the various defendants here are parties to an arbitration agreement. A salient question is whether that agreement permits or prohibits arbitration on a classwide basis. Here we must answer a question one step removed—who decides whether the agreement permits or prohibits classwide arbitration, a court or the arbitrator? The question has divided the many state and federal courts to consider it.

We conclude no universal rule allocates this decision in all cases to either arbitrators or courts. Rather, who decides is in the first instance a matter of agreement, with the parties’ agreement subject to interpretation under state contract law. Under state law, these parties’ arbitration agreement allocates the decision to the arbitrator. Under federal arbitration law, no contrary presumption requires a different result, so the issue remains one for the arbitrator. Because the Court of Appeal arrived at a similar answer, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The material facts are not in dispute. In 2000, plaintiff Timothy Sandquist was hired by defendants (collectively, Lebo or Lebo Automotive) to work as a salesperson at an automotive…

Dissenting.—“Class arbitration is a matter of consent: An arbitrator may employ class procedures only if the parties have authorized them.” (Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter (2013) 569 U.S. 564, 565 [ 186 L.Ed.2d 113 , 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2066 ] (Oxford Health).) In this case, the trial court held that the parties’ agreement did not authorize class arbitration. Plaintiff Timothy Sandquist argues that the arbitrator, rather than the court, should have made that determination. The focus of my disagreement with the majority involves the question of federal law at the center of this case: Whether, under the Federal Arbitration Act ( 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (FAA)), the availability of class arbitration under the parties’ agreement is a “gateway *262 question of arbitrability” that is presumptively for a court to decide, or whether it is instead a matter presumptively reserved for the arbitrator.

In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle (2003) 539 U.S. 444, 451-452 [ 156 L.Ed.2d 414 , 123 S.Ct. 2402 ] (Green Tree), a plurality of the United States Supreme Court took the view that the classwide arbitrability question is a procedural matter, rather than a gateway question of arbitrability. The…