Victor Sandoval-Arreguin v. Loretta E. Lynch

MEMORANDUM **

Petitioner Victor Sandoval-Arreguin petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision denying his applications for cancellation of removal, asylum, and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and protection under the Convention Against Torture. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We deny the petition for review.

The parties dispute whether we have jurisdiction to review Sandoval-Arreguin’s challenges to the BIA’s denial of cancellation of removal and its determination that his conviction for transportation of methamphetamine, in violation of California Health & Safety Code § 11379(a), was a “particularly serious crime.” See Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that this court typically lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s finding that a case does not warrant a discretionary grant of cancellation of removal, but it retains jurisdiction over constitutional claims and questions of law (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(B)(i), (a)(2)(D)); Pechenkov v. Holder, 705 F.3d 444, 447-48 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. §…

dissenting:

It is well settled by our court that we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s discretionary denial of an application for cancellation of removal. See Vilchez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 2012). Sandoval-Arreguin raised no color-able constitutional claims or questions of law pertaining to the agency’s discretionary hardship determination, and I would dismiss this claim for lack of jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(D).

Sandoval-Arreguin conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (a)(2)(B)(i) and has not raised any colorable constitutional claims or legal questions in relation to the Board’s particularly serious crime determination. While our court is not barred from reviewing the agency’s particularly serious crime determinations, it cannot reweigh the evidence to determine whether the crime was particularly serious. See Pe *658 chenkov v. Holder, 705 F.3d 444, 448-49 (9th Cir. 2012). A particularly serious crime determination “is inherently discretionary where ... the only challenge to that determination is that it incorrectly assessed the facts.” Id. at 448 . See also 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (a)(2)(C). I would dismiss the claims for asylum, withholding…

facts of the conviction. See Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 384-85 (9th Cir. 2012)

(per curiam) (setting forth standard of review and factors for consideration).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

FILED

Sandoval-Arreguin v. Lynch, 13-73349

JUL 28 2016

WALLACE, J., dissenting: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

It is well settled by our court that we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s

discretionary denial of an application for cancellation of removal. See Vilchez v.

Holder, 682 F.3d 1195, 1200-02 (9th Cir. 2012). Sandoval-Arreguin raised no

colorable constitutional claims or questions of law pertaining to the agency’s

discretionary hardship determination, and I would dismiss this claim for lack of

jurisdiction. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

Sandoval-Arreguin conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i)

and has not raised any colorable constitutional claims or legal questions in relation

to the Board’s particularly serious crime determination. While our court is not

barred from reviewing the agency’s particularly serious crime determinations, it

cannot reweigh the evidence to determine whether the…