22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4c1,MEMORANDUM Buford Eddy Terwilleger appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges a condition of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for failure to register and update sex offender registration, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm. Terwilleger challenges the condition of supervised release requiring him to participate in a sexual-deviancy assessment. We review for an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010), and find none. Contrary to Terwilleger’s contentions, the condition is reasonably related to the goals of protect ing the public and rehabilitation in light of his history and characteristics and involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (d)(1), (2); United States v. Johnson, 697 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 2012) (an assessment condition is a “much less significant restraint” than sex offender treatment and justified even when the prior convictions are decades-old). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T4ee,

MEMORANDUM

Buford Eddy Terwilleger appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges a condition of supervised release imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for failure to register and update sex offender registration, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250 (a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

Terwilleger challenges the condition of supervised release requiring him to participate in a sexual-deviancy assessment. We review for an abuse of discretion, see United States v. Napulou, 593 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010), and find none. Contrary to Terwilleger’s contentions, the condition is reasonably related to the goals of protect ing the public and rehabilitation in light of his history and characteristics and involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (d)(1), (2); United States v. Johnson, 697 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 2012) (an assessment condition is a “much less significant restraint” than sex offender treatment and justified even when the prior convictions are decades-old).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.