22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T517,MEMORANDUM Minerva Leticia Aviles-Ocampo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s order of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 . We review de novo legal claims, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004), and deny the petition for review. Aviles-Ocampo does not challenge the agency’s dispositive determination that her petty theft with priors convictions constitute crimes involving moral turpitude that render her statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)-(C); Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083 , 1091 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2011) (issues not raised in an opening brief are waived). We reject Aviles-Ocampo’s contention that the BIA engaged in improper fact-finding in determining she was not eligible for cancellation of removal and declining to remand to the immigration judge. In light of our disposition, we do not reach Aviles-Ocampo’s remaining contention regarding whether her convictions constitute aggravated felonies. See Simeonov, 371 F.3d at 538 . PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED. This disposition is not, appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T54e,

MEMORANDUM

Minerva Leticia Aviles-Ocampo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s order of removal. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 . We review de novo legal claims, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004), and deny the petition for review.

Aviles-Ocampo does not challenge the agency’s dispositive determination that her petty theft with priors convictions constitute crimes involving moral turpitude that render her statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(B)-(C); Rizk v. Holder, 629 F.3d 1083 , 1091 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2011) (issues not raised in an opening brief are waived).

We reject Aviles-Ocampo’s contention that the BIA engaged in improper fact-finding in determining she was not eligible for cancellation of removal and declining to remand to the immigration judge.

In light of our disposition, we do not reach Aviles-Ocampo’s remaining contention regarding whether her convictions constitute aggravated felonies. See Simeonov, 371 F.3d at 538 .

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

This disposition is not, appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.