DISCUSSION

I Pitchess Motion Defendant requests that we independently review the trial court’s ruling regarding his Pitchess motion. “A trial court’s decision on the discoverability of material in police personnel files is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1220-1221 (Jackson).) To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion, the appellate court must review the record of the documents examined by the trial court. (People v. Mooc (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1216, 1228-1229.) A defendant is entitled to “meaningful appellate review” of the confidential documents, and a trial court may preserve the record by stating which documents it examined. (Ibid.) Where, as here, the trial court reviewed a document that was subsequently destroyed, a constitutional error exists only if it appears the record was destroyed in bad

3 faith. (Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1221, fn. 10; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 831-832.) The custodian of records does not explain in his sworn declaration why the files examined by the trial court regarding Officer O’Shea were destroyed as of July 2015. Based on our review of the sealed transcript, there is no evidence the complaint involving Officer O’Shea was destroyed in bad faith. In sum, we have reviewed the sealed transcript of the hearing held in camera and conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the records contained no discoverable material. II Credits Defendant contends the trial court improperly calculated his presentence custody credit as 386 days, and the People agree. Here, the defendant spent 373 actual days in custody, and the trial court determined he was entitled to full credit for those days. Where a defendant earns all days under section 4019, “a term of four days will be deemed to have been served for every two days spent in actual custody.” (§ 4019, subd. (f); see also People v. Whitaker (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1354, 1359-1360.) Accordingly, it was error for the trial court to deduct the 180-day sentence from actual days served before calculating the section 4019 credit. The trial court should have awarded defendant 373 days spent in actual custody, plus 372 days conduct credit, for a total of 745 days credit, and then deducted the 180-day sentence. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a); see also Whitaker, at pp. 1358-1359 [not awarding an additional single day of conduct credit where a defendant served an odd number of days].)

DISPOSITION

The award of credits is modified to award defendant 373 actual days and 372 conduct credits, or 745 days total. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended

4 abstract of judgment and to forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is affirmed.

/s/

HOCH, J.

We concur:

/s/ BLEASE, Acting P. J.

/s/

ROBIE, J.

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