Dion Anderson v. Edmund Brown, Jr.
Opinion
Opinion
MEMORANDUM
California state prisoner Dion Anderson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Anderson’s action because Anderson failed to allege facts sufficient to state any plau sible claim for relief. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief).
The district court properly determined that, as a pro se party, Anderson could not litigate the instant action as a class action. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008) (“It is well established that the privilege to represent oneself pro se provided by [28 U.S.C.] § 1654 is personal to the litigant and does not extend to other parties or entities.”).