DISCUSSION

I. Former Section 786

Despite making certain concessions below, Minor still contends on appeal that his

first petition should have been sealed under former section 786. The People respond that

his first petition could not be sealed under former section 786 because the petition was

dismissed in 2013, prior to the statute's effective date. We agree with the People.

We are guided by the well-established rule that a "statute applies prospectively

only, unless the Legislature clearly expresses an intent that it operate retroactively."

3 (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 664; see Evangelatos v. Superior Court

(1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1207 [" '[it] is an established canon of interpretation that statutes

are not to be given a retrospective operation unless it is clearly made to appear that such

was the legislative intent' "].)

Furthermore, to ascertain the Legislature's intent, "[w]e must look to the statute's

words and give them their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The statute's plain

meaning controls the court's interpretation unless its words are ambiguous. If the plain

language of a statute is unambiguous, no court need, or should, go beyond that pure

expression of legislative intent." (Green v. State of California (2007) 42 Cal.4th 254,

260.)

Applying the above principles, we conclude the juvenile court did not err because

it could not apply former section 786 to seal a previously dismissed petition. Former

section 786 became effective on January 1, 2015, and provided in pertinent part:

"If the minor satisfactorily completes (a) an informal program of supervision pursuant to Section 654.2, . . . or (c) a term of probation for any offense not listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707, the court shall order the petition dismissed, and the arrest upon which the judgment was deferred shall be deemed not to have occurred. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court . . . ." (Italics added.)

Former section 786 did not contain any language permitting a court to seal records

pertaining to a petition dismissed prior to the statute's effective date, and instead, the

plain and unambiguous language described dismissal and sealing together, prospectively.

Minor fails to identify any ambiguous or uncertain statutory language.

Contrary to Minor's position, the Legislature has not expressed an intent for the

4 automatic sealing provisions of former section 786 to apply to previously dismissed

petitions. (See In re Y.A. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 523, 527 (Y.A.) ["[T]he plain language

of former section 786 did not support the proposition that it was intended to be a panacea

for all sealing issues."].) Courts may not interpret a statute in a way that effectively adds

provisions or rewrites it to conform to an assumed intent that does not appear from its

plain language. (People v. Connor (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 669, 692.) Before and after

the enactment of former section 786, section 781 has provided a method for individuals

to petition the court to seal their juvenile records. (See In re G.Y. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th

1196, 1200 ["The right to have juvenile records sealed is governed by section 781."];

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.830.) The juvenile court did not misconstrue the scope of

former section 786.

II. Amended Section 786

Turning to Minor's primary argument on appeal, he contends the records relating

to his first petition should be sealed under the current version of section 786, which

became effective on January 1, 2016, after the court terminated jurisdiction over him. He

relies on In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), to support the contention that

amended section 786 may be retroactively applied and argues Y.A., supra, 246

Cal.App.4th at page 527, is distinguishable because the minor in Y.A. did not successfully

complete probation for her first petition while he successfully completed an informal

program of supervision.

Based on its plain language, amended section 786 does not operate retroactively.

The amended statute contains a similar requirement as its former version for sealing

5 records pertaining to a pending petition if the minor satisfactorily completes probation.3

However, the Legislature added a number of new subdivisions, including subdivision

(e)(1), which states in part, "[t]he court may, in making its order to seal the record and

dismiss the instant petition pursuant to this section, include an order to seal a record

relating to, or to dismiss, any prior petition or petitions that have been filed or

sustained . . . ." (§ 786, subd. (e)(1).) There is no legislative indication in the language

of amended section 786 that it should be applied in lieu of the relevant law in effect at the

time of the court's sealing order, former section 786.

Estrada does not support Minor's position. Estrada teaches that "[w]hen the

Legislature amends a statute so as to lessen the punishment it has obviously expressly

determined that its former penalty was too severe and that a lighter punishment is proper

as punishment for the commission of the prohibited act. . . . This intent seems obvious,

because to hold otherwise would be to conclude that the Legislature was motivated by a

desire for vengeance, a conclusion not permitted in view of modern theories of

penology." (Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745, italics added; People v. Brown (2012)

54 Cal.4th 314, 324-325 (Brown) [affirming the Estrada rule applies only when a

legislative act "mitigate[s] the punishment for a particular criminal offense" based on the

inferred legislative intent to impose a lighter penalty].)

Amended section 786 does not impose a punishment or penalty for any offense; it

3 Amended section 786 provides in pertinent part: "If the minor satisfactorily completes . . . a term of probation for any offense, the court shall order the petition dismissed. The court shall order sealed all records pertaining to that dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court . . . ." (§ 786, subd. (a).) 6 addresses circumstances requiring and permitting a court to seal juvenile records. The

statute is not punitive in nature, and accordingly, does not lend itself to the inference

discussed in Estrada of legislative intent to impose a reduced penalty to nonfinal cases.

(See § 202, subd. (e) [listing punishments for delinquent minors].) Amended section 786

operates prospectively, providing an incentive for minors to satisfactorily complete

probation for offenses alleged in pending (i.e., "instant") petitions. (§ 786, subd. (e)(1).)

Furthermore, although Minor accurately relates a factual distinction between his

case and the minor in Y.A., supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at page 527—a successful versus

unsuccessful completion of supervision/probation—the distinction is of no significance to

our legal analysis regarding retroactivity. As we have discussed, the Legislature has not

indicated that amended section 786 was intended to operate retroactively in lieu of former

section 786. (Cf. Brown, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 325 [statute that increased rate at which

prisoners earned credit for good behavior was not intended to operate retroactively and it

provided increased incentives for future good behavior].)

In summary, the court properly limited its sealing order to the records of Minor's

last petition under former section 786, and amended section 786 does not operate

retroactively. Minor retains the ability to petition the court to seal his remaining juvenile

records under section 781. (§ 781; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.830.)

7

DISPOSITION

The order denying Minor's motion to seal petition number G1907 is affirmed.

HALLER, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

McDONALD, J.

IRION, J.

8