Susan Serpe (Serpe), plaintiff and appellant, brought this Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) action against Four-Phase Systems, Inc. (Four-Phase), defendant and appellee, alleging several acts of sex discrimination. The trial court made findings and conclusions, and on the basis of them a judgment was entered for defendant-appellee. This appeal followed.

The district court’s findings of fact disposed of all but one of Serpe’s claims on the merits. The evidence was in conflict, there was substantial evidence supporting the court’s findings, and they cannot be disturbed on appeal.

The one exception concerns a claim by Serpe that, because she is a woman, Four-Phase would not transfer her from the technical division to the sales division. Employees in the sales division received greater compensation than those at a comparable level in the technical division. The district court did not reach the merits of this claim but denied it on the grounds that it had not been presented to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and that in any event it was time-barred.

In a Title VII action, the subject matter of the court’s jurisdiction extends only to those claims made before the EEOC. Shah v. Mt. Zion Hospital & Medical Center, 642 F.2d 268 (9th Cir.1981). The EEOC charge in this case contained the following language:

In Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.1975), the court said:

525 F.2d at 1359. Kaplan quoted the following language from Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir.1970): “ ‘[i]t is only logical to limit the permissible scope of the civil action to the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’ ” 525 F.2d at 1359.

The charge made to the EEOC in this case did not state in so many words that Four-Phase had refused to put Serpe in sales because she is a woman, but, in our opinion, an investigation of the charges made in the quoted language would have revealed plaintiff’s claim that she did request transfers and that, because she is a woman, her requests were denied. We think that the EEOC claims are sufficient to sustain the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction.

We then reach the limitations question. Plaintiff testified that she made several requests for transfers and that they were all denied. She testified that she was told by people in management that she could not go into sales because she is a woman. From this and other evidence, the court might have concluded that there was a policy which prohibited the employment of women in the sales department.

There is no doubt but that, in the case of a single isolated act as distinguished from a systematic policy of discrimination, the statute commences to run when a lay person should have perceived discrimination occurring. An act of firing or refusing to hire is a discrete act and starts the statute to run.

But, where there is a systematic policy of discrimination, the rule, with respect to employees who remain employed but claim that their status has been adversely affected by the discriminatory policy, is as follows:

Elliott v. Sperry Rand Corp., 79 F.R.D. 580, 586 (D.Minn.1978) (emphasis added).

The doctrine expressed in the emphasized language was quoted with approval and applied in Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918, 924 (9th Cir.1982), and Reed v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 613 F.2d 757, 761 (9th Cir.1980). In Williamstbe court stated that the trial court had erred “in concluding that the continuing violations doctrine did not apply to discriminatory placements or denials of promotions.” 665 F.2d at 924 . Both Williams and Reed involved promotions. It may be, as the district court held, that there is some difference between failure to promote and failure to transfer if the rule is as stated by the district court: “ ‘The focus is on what event, in fairness and logic, should have alerted a lay person to act to protect his right or when he should have perceived discrimination occurring.’ ” Serpe v. Four Phase Systems, Inc., No. C-82-0464-WWS (Dist.N.Cal., Nov. 22, 1982), quoting Elliott, 79 F.R.D. at 585 . If, however, we judge the system, as we must, in terms of what “deters the employee from seeking his full employment rights,” we are unable to distinguish a systematic refusal to transfer from a systematic refusal to promote. If the systematic discrimination exception does not apply here, it is not because a transfer can be distinguished from a promotion, but because there was no systematic discrimination. The district court did not make a finding of fact on that issue.

By nothing said in this opinion have we intended to comment on the validity of the plaintiff’s claim based on a refusal to transfer or on the question of whether there was a systematic discrimination.

The judgment is affirmed as to all claims except the claim of discrimination based on the refusal to transfer Serpe to the sales division. As to that claim the judgment is reversed with directions to the district court to determine whether, as a matter of fact, there was a systematic refusal to place women in sales positions. If the court finds in the affirmative on that issue, it shall then decide the refusal to transfer claim on its merits.

. Serpe did claim that there was one refusal to transfer her which was not time-barred. On conflicting evidence, the court found against Serpe on the merits of that claim. We do not disturb that finding. . In London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811 (9th Cir.1981), involving a discharge, this language appears: Absent special circumstances, a single act by an employer adverse to an employee’s interests, such as a discharge, layoff, or failure to transfer or promote, begins the running of the statute of limitations and the natural effects of the alleged discriminatory act are not regarded as “continuing.” 644 F.2d at 816 . Since this case involved a discharge, what was said as to promotions and transfers is dictum. We further believe that, at least insofar as transfers and promotions are concerned, the statement was intended to apply only to isolated acts that occur on only one specific occasion and are in no way the result of any general policy of discrimination. In any event, the proper rule with respect to continuing violations both in promotion and transfer cases is that set forth in Williams v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 665 F.2d 918 (9th Cir.1982).