DISCUSSION

Hansen contends the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation

and sentenced him to four years in state prison.

3 A. Governing Law

"Section 1203.2(a) states that a 'court may revoke . . . probation if the court, in its

judgment, has reason to believe that the [probationer] has violated any of the conditions

of . . . probation . . . or has subsequently committed other offenses . . . .' (Italics added.)

It has long been recognized that the Legislature, through this language, intended to give

trial courts very broad discretion in determining whether a probationer has violated

probation. (See, e.g., People v. Lippner (1933) 219 Cal. 395, 400 ['. . . only in a very

extreme case should an appellate court interfere with the discretion of the trial court in

the matter of denying or revoking probation. . . .'].)" (People v. Rodriguez (1990) 51

Cal.3d 437, 443 (Rodriguez).)

"Sentencing choices such as the one at issue here, whether to reinstate probation or

sentence a defendant to prison, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. 'A denial or a grant

of probation generally rests within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be

disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an

arbitrary or capricious manner.' [Citation.] A court abuses its discretion 'whenever the

court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.'

[Citation.] We will not interfere with the trial court's exercise of discretion 'when it has

considered all facts bearing on the offense and the defendant to be sentenced.' " (People

v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899, 909-910 (Downey).) "[T]he burden of

demonstrating an abuse of the trial court's discretion rests squarely on the defendant."

(People v. Urke (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 766, 773 (Urke).)

4 B. Analysis

Hansen argues that his probation violations were minimal in nature and that other

more reasonable means existed whereby he could be supervised on probation without

posing a threat to society. He specifically contends the finding he was using marijuana

was based on insufficient evidence because he drank copious amounts of water before he

took the drug test and because the text messages where he appeared to arrange for the

purchase of marijuana were inconclusive and, at best, ambiguous. Additionally, he

contends his failure to provide his Facebook password to his probation officer was an

insignificant Fourth Amendment waiver violation that could have also been handled with

a more appropriate response than a prison sentence.

The People contend that the court properly exercised its broad discretion in

revoking Hansen's probation and sentencing him to prison. The People further contend

that Hansen responded to the court's clemency by using marijuana and resisting his

probation officer's request for his Facebook password so she could monitor his social

media activity; that he has not provided any authority whereby a court must give a

defendant an additional opportunity to abide by the terms of his or her probation; and,

most importantly, that the four-year prison sentence was not imposed solely because of

Hansen's marijuana use and Fourth Amendment waiver violation but also because of the

gravity of the underlying arson offense.

We agree with the People that Hansen was not sentenced to four years in state

prison only because he violated the terms of his probation but, rather, because he violated

5 probation in connection with a serious offense. It can hardly be disputed, as Hansen

concedes, that lighting brush fires involves "conduct that could have presented a serious

danger to persons or property, particularly in drought[-]stricken California." Although

Hansen argues the probation violations were minimal, they were nonetheless violations.

(See Rodriguez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 440 [noting the court may revoke probation if

there is reason to believe the defendant violated any of the conditions of probation].)

Hansen does not, nor can he, argue that he complied with all the terms and

conditions of his probation. The only reason he was on probation was because he

pleaded guilty to arson, and the trial court stayed a prison sentence in favor of supervised

probation as an act of leniency so that Hansen would have an opportunity to reform his

conduct. (See Urke, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 773 [noting trial court granted

probation so that the defendant could reform conduct with support and supervision of law

enforcement and medical professionals].)

The record indicates that the trial court considered all the facts regarding the arson

offense, Hansen's conduct while on probation, and how Hansen had been treated by the

VA and the criminal justice system when deciding whether to reinstate probation. Based

on the record, we conclude the court properly exercised its broad discretion when it found

that Hansen violated his probation terms and sentenced him accordingly. (See Downey,

supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 909.)

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DISPOSITION

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

BENKE, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

O'ROURKE, J.

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