dissenting:

When reviewing a penalty imposed by the Merit Systems Protection Board, it is our statutory responsibility to determine whether the sanction is so harsh or disproportionate as to constitute an abuse of discretion, 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (c) Supp. V 1981, whether the Board failed to follow its own principles and precedents, and whether there is substantial evidence to support the conclusion that the penalty promotes the efficiency of the government agency involved, 5 U.S.C. § 7513 Supp. V 1981. By routinely deferring to the conclusory findings of the Board, the majority has, in my opinion, ignored its responsibility and affirmed the imposition of an arbitrary and irrational penalty. Moreover, it has also ignored the failure of the Board to follow its own principles, and has erred in finding substantial evidence that the penalty promotes the efficiency of the service. I therefore respectfully dissent.

I.

How the facts in a particular case appear is often dependent on how the author of an opinion chooses to characterize them. That is certainly the case here. Although the majority opinion accurately sets forth certain historical occurrences, the picture that emerges of Raymond McClaskey’s conduct is far different from the view one might obtain from a more understanding or less judgmental reporting of the same events. Therefore, I will try to restate the facts in a manner which may help put the legal issues in a better perspective.

Two employees of the Bonneville Power Agency, Lapp and Rhew, unlawfully used agency purchasing documents to obtain $418.00 worth of wire for their personal use. Raymond McClaskey was not aware of and did not in any way participate in this unlawful scheme. Afterwards, the two employees, fearing discovery of their actions, asked McClaskey, a co-worker and friend, to help them replace the wire. Reluctantly, McClaskey did so, not for personal gain, but solely in order to help his friends. He picked up the replacement wire for them, used his own check for payment, and put the wire in the agency bins. Later, when his friends told him that his efforts were to no avail — that the investigators already knew of their unlawful acts — McClaskey removed the replacement wire he had put in the bins and restored the status quo ante. His attempt to assist his friends ended in total failure, and the government was in no way prevented from carrying out its investigation.

McClaskey was perfectly candid and wholly cooperative with the investigators. Only his insistence that he had committed a wrongful act permitted the Board to arrive at a finding of guilty. As the Board itself concluded, McClaskey’s conduct did “not quite constitute ‘knowingly participating in a plan to prevent Government investigators from learning the truth about the unauthorized acquisition and use of wire paid for by’ the agency, as charged in the removal notice. Nothing in the record indicates how [McClaskey’s] conduct could ‘prevent Government investigators from learning the truth’ about this matter.” Opinion and Order of MSPB, p. 3.

McClaskey was a model employee throughout his fourteen continuous years of service for the Bonneville Power Administration. At the extensive hearing conducted by the Board’s Presiding Official, “[a]n impressive number of [McClaskey’s] supervisors and co-workers testified that *591 [McClaskey] was conscientious, dependable, loyal and well-respected by his fellow employees,” “an exceptionally competent electrician who took pride in his job and ability to be a good craftsman,” and a person of “honesty, integrity and superior performance on the job.” Decision of Presiding Official, p. 5. The Board does not in any way dispute these characterizations of McClaskey as a worker and as a person. Rather, it argues that, in spite of this un-contradicted testimony, McClaskey should be dismissed for the single mistake he committed during his fourteen years as a government employee.

In light of McClaskey’s exemplary work record and the absence of any motivation of personal gain, the Board and the majority offer only one justification for his dismissal: the need for the agency to be able to trust employees who have been delegated the authority to make purchases. Opinion and Order of MSPB, p. 3; Majority Opinion, supra, at pp. 586-587. This reason, however, is totally unpersuasive and ignores the specific facts of McClaskey’s case. At a hearing before the Board’s Presiding Official, McClaskey’s supervisors “testified that [he] was the best electrician the Agency had.” This testimony also convinced the Presiding Official that “learning the facts underlying the charge did not change [the supervisors’] opinion of [McClaskey] as an excellent employee at all.” Decision of- Presiding Official, p. 5. She concluded that McClaskey’s “conduct appears to have had little, if any, effect on the confidence of [his] supervisors in his ability to perform the duties of his job.” Id. In short, on the basis of the evidence in the record, the Presiding Official found no reason to believe that McClas-key would not be a trustworthy employee in the future.

The Board’s Presiding Official decided in a lengthy, thorough and well-reasoned opinion that McClaskey should not be dismissed and that a 30-day suspension would constitute appropriate punishment. The cursory Board opinion reinstating McClaskey’s dismissal stands in sharp contrast to the carefully reasoned judgment of the Presiding Official. Indeed, the generalized and eon-clusory findings of the Board suggest that McClaskey’s case was not properly considered on its own merits. Rather than examining the particular facts of McClas-key’s situation, the Board’s brief four-page' decision offers only conclusory statements that are unsupported by the evidence presented to the Presiding Official. And the majority opinion defers to these conclusions of the Board, once again without any attempt to refute the very particularized findings of the Presiding Official.

II.

It is our duty to decide whether the punishment imposed is so disproportionate to the offense as to constitute an abuse of discretion. 5 U.S.C. § 7703 (c) Supp. V 1976. 1 There is no doubt that such a judgment is sometimes difficult to make. Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has very recently reaffirmed, decisions regarding the proportionality of punishment, “although troubling, are not unique to this area. The courts are constantly called upon to draw similar lines in a variety of contexts.” Solem v. Helm, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3012 , 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). Thus, in the context of criminal sentencing — an area presenting much more complex situations than the one involved here — the Supreme Court has insisted that there are “objective” and “generally accepted criteria for comparing the severity of different crimes on a broad scale.” Id. 103 S.Ct. at 3011 .

The Board and the majority have failed to apply any such criteria to McClaskey’s case or to set forth any criteria to be considered. Nor is there any reasoned discussion regarding the comparative seriousness of the offense. Nevertheless, the principal factors to be considered emerge clearly from the record. The Presiding Official *592 found, on the basis of undisputed testimony, that McClaskey was a model employee who had no disciplinary record and that his role in the affair was a limited one. No one questions the fact that McClaskey was acting to help his desperate friends, with no thought of personal gain. Moreover, all agree that McClaskey was attempting to replace government property, not steal it, and the Board itself found that McClaskey’s behavior could not possibly have served to “cover-up” the incident. Finally, the Presiding Officer emphasized that McClaskey’s immediate supervisors and co-workers expressed their continuing trust and confidence in him even after being told of his behavior.

Despite the thorough findings of the Presiding Official, the Board and the majority have decided that McClaskey should receive .the same punishment as the two principals ' who defrauded the government for personal gain — even though dismissal from government service constitutes the harshest sanction possible. In this era of record high unemployment and scarce employment opportunities, dismissal for wrongful conduct may be equivalent to an economic death sentence for the employee. It is not a penalty to be lightly ordered or routinely upheld. It should be reserved for the most serious of offenses or for cases in which it has been demonstrated that lesser punishment is ineffective. Here, the majority has endorsed the use of the ultimate sanction, even though McClaskey’s lengthy work record is exemplary and his role in the affair was both minimal and secondary. I believe it errs in doing so, and that we should perform our statutory duty and find that McClaskey’s punishment is so disproportionate to his offense as to constitute an abuse of discretion.

III.

There is another reason why I believe reversal is required. Neither the Board nor the majority mentions a well-recognized principle of employer-employee relations that is, in my view, dispositive of this case- — progressive discipline. At oral argument, counsel for the government grudgingly conceded that the Board recognizes the applicability of that principle “in general.” Thus, the government is bound to follow the rule, if applicable to the facts of a particular case.

Progressive discipline has long been a hallmark of enlightened employee relations. The purpose of “progressive discipline” is to make “employees more secure in their jobs.” National Labor Relations Board v. General Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965 , 970 n. 18 (3d Cir.1981) (citing arbitrator’s decision). To achieve this goal, progressive discipline requires that “progressively more severe penalties for successive violations of” an employer’s rules be administered. Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Local No. 684, 671 F.2d 797 , 799 (4th Cir.1982); see also National Labor Relations Board v. New York University Medical Center, 702 F.2d 284, 288 (2d Cir.1983). Discharge from employment is used only as a “last resort.” American Thread Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 631 F.2d 316 , 319 n. 3 (4th Cir.1980).

I do not suggest that a first offense can never be sufficiently egregious to warrant dismissal. However, where a lesser punishment can adequately serve the governmental purpose, the .ultimate penalty should not be imposed the first time an employee errs. Despite its acknowledged commitment to the principle of progressive discipline, the Board, in ordering McClaskey’s dismissal, ignored the principle completely. Rather than using other possible sanctions such as suspension — which the Presiding Official found would be sufficient to deter future misconduct, the government fired, as its “first resort,” an employee with an unblemished work record because of a tangential post hoc involvement in a fraudulent scheme perpetrated by others. The government’s failure to follow its own rules is, to me, sufficient reason in itself to warrant reversal. 2

*593 IV.

In my view, the majority has also erred in finding that there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s conclusion that the penalty of dismissal will promote the efficiency of the agency. Majority Opinion, supra, at pp. 588-589. To begin with, the majority opinion confuses the two distinct inquiries necessitated by the section 7513 efficiency requirement. The agency must first determine whether the efficiency of the service justifies the imposition of any discipline whatsoever for the particular offense. Most courts have referred to this as the nexus requirement. Second, the agency must decide whether the particular punishment imposed will promote the efficiency of the service. Despite the fact that both of these requirements must be met, the majority’s discussion is devoted almost exclusively to the question whether the misconduct is job-related and thus whether the imposition of any discipline whatsoever is appropriate. See Majority Opinion, at pp. 586-587.

This discussion does not, however, answer the question whether the dismissal of McClaskey promotes the efficiency of the service. On the latter point, the majority says only that because the Board established the fact that McClaskey’s job is one in which honesty is required the substantial evidence standard has been met. I do not agree. 3

*594 The Board made no specific findings on the issue of whether McClaskey’s dismissal would promote the efficiency of the service. Instead, the Board made several generalized, conclusory statements in explanation of its determination that discharge was not an unreasonable penalty. These statements are wholly unpersuasive and find little, if any, support in the record. Neither the Board nor the majority made any serious attempt to examine the appropriateness of the penalty imposed upon McClaskey in light of the section 7513 efficiency requirement. Only the Presiding Official has undertaken such a particularized inquiry.

In view of the testimony presented, I agree with the Presiding Official’s conclusion that “the efficiency of the Agency’s operations may well be enhanced by the imposition of” a 30-day suspension rather than dismissal. This is in part because “[t]he record contains evidence that the morale of many Agency employees was very low due to the Agency’s decision to remove” McClaskey. Decision of Presiding Official, p. 6. This finding is not even mentioned by either the Board or the majority. In fact, a comparison between the detailed, particularized findings of the Presiding Official and the cursory, generalized conclusions of the Board leaves little doubt that the Board’s decision that the efficiency of the service will be promoted by McClaskey’s discharge is unsupported by substantial evidence. 4

I would reverse the decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board and reinstate the 30-day suspension imposed by the Presiding Official. 5

. We have found discharge to be an excessive punishment on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Francisco v. Campbell, 625 F.2d 266, 269-70 (9th Cir.1980); Albert v. Chafee, 571 F.2d 1063, 1068 (9th Cir.1977). So have other courts. See, e.g., Power v. United States, 531 F.2d 505, 509 , 209 Ct.Cl. 126 (1976).

. The majority states in its “progressive discipline” argument that I propose to substitute my judgment for that of the Board’s. That is not the case. The Board failed to make any *593 judgment. It did not even mention “progressive discipline.” It is difficult to determine why the Board did not consider this principle in reaching its decision. Whenever an employee contends that the degree of discipline is not warranted, an agency must consider that contention and determine, inter alia, whether, under its own rules and principles, the argument is correct. If the agency follows the well-established progressive discipline principle, then that is one of the matters the agency must consider.

The majority suggests that the Board followed “a principle” of progressive discipline, but not “the principle.” Such a distinction seems to me a most unpersuasive way of seeking to avoid the fact that the Board failed to apply whatever principle of progressive discipline was applicable. The majority’s suggestion that the government attorney was “obviously unaware” of the agency’s specific policy is similarly unpersuasive. To the contrary, it seems to me that the government attorney was simply attempting to be evasive. The colloquy on this point is set forth below:

JUDGE REINHARDT: Does the Merits Board recognize the general principle that is utilized in employment relations that progressive discipline is normally the appropriate tool except in exceptional circumstances?

GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY: The Merit Systems Protection Board recognizes that the primary discretion for choice of the penalty lies with the agency.

Q: That’s a different question. The question was “Do they recognize the general principle of progressive discipline when possible and except in extreme circumstances?”

A: They recognize a principle of progressive discipline. But that does not mean that one, for an action such as this, has to start with a reprimand and the next time a three day suspension, and the next time a five day, and the next time a 30 day.

Q: I know it doesn’t mean that. But they do recognize this principle....

A: I should also point out, your Honors, (INTERRUPTS) (moves on to another- point). (Emphasis added).

If the majority disagrees with the decisional law that describes what progressive discipline is, it has not explained why.

The majority’s second line of defense is that we should not credit the representation even if made — that a government attorney’s statements at oral argument are not worthy of the treatment I afford them. I disagree. When a' government attorney, in response to a question, advises us as to the position or policy of the government, I believe we should treat that representation seriously, whether grudgingly made or not. Government attorneys have a particular public responsibility to fulfill when asked to advise us of the relevant facts and law, or to inform us concerning a governmental practice, procedure or policy. If erroneous statements are made at oral argument, they can and should be corrected later. In this case, there is no reason to believe that the government attorney’s response was incorrect. Progressive discipline is a well-recognized and long established principle of labor-management relations. It would be surprising if the government did not follow it.

. The majority cites our decision in D.E. v. Department of the Navy, MSPB, 707 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir.1983), to support its assertion that a particular punishment can legally be imposed even though it does not promote — and may, as in this case, actually hinder — the efficiency of the service. See Majority Opinion, supra at note 3. Yet D.E. v. Department of Navy, MSPB did not involve a challenge to the appropriateness of a particular penalty or the relationship of a penalty to the agency’s efficiency. On the contrary, the issue in D.E. was whether off-duty misconduct justified the imposition of *594 any punishment whatsoever. The question of whether the particular punishment imposed actually promoted the efficiency of the service was not even before the court. D.E. therefore does not support the majority’s position.

The majority misunderstands my position, just as it misunderstands our decision in D.E. See Majority Opinion, supra at note 3. I agree completely with the conclusion that McClas-key’s conduct was job-related and thus justifies the imposition of some punishment. This conclusion seems to me to be non-controversial. It was not put in issue by the parties and is not before us. Unfortunately, however, the majority’s analysis is devoted almost exclusively to this question of whether the conduct is job-related and so deserves to be punished in some way. There is much dictum as to when the nexus between the job and the conduct may be presumed. What the majority largely ignores is the question of whether the particular punishment imposed promotes the efficiency of the service. It is on this crucial point that we disagree.

. The Presiding Official also made uncontra-dicted findings on the question of deterring dishonest conduct in this particular case. After evaluating “the evidence of [McClaskey’s] character, as shown by his testimony and that of his friends, co-workers and supervisors,” the Presiding Official decided “that the penalty of a thirty day suspension would adequately and effectively deter” McClaskey from such conduct in the future. Decision of Presiding Official, p. 6. Moreover, the dismissal sanctions imposed on the two workers who actually attempted to defraud the government should serve to deter other employees.

. McClaskey’s immaculate employment record, the continuing confidence of his supervisors, and the extenuating circumstances surrounding his behavior all combine to distinguish his case from the precedents cited by the majority. See Majority Opinion, supra, at p. 587. In addition, the majority’s brief descriptions of the precedents unduly minimize the nature of the misconduct involved in each case. Book v. United States, 675 F.2d 158 (8th Cir.1982) (per curiam), for example, involved misconduct by a postmaster — a supervisor who “occupied a position of trust,” id. at 161 , and whom we rightly expect to set an example for his workers. The $22.00 figure mentioned in the majority’s description was supplied by Postmaster Book himself; the court actually found that the “dollar value of the tools and supplies is not clearly set out in the record.” Id. at 160 . Indeed, the postmaster’s thefts hardly appear to be isolated or minimal. Among various other items found in his home, the postmaster admitted taking “four sockets, one socket adapter, three rolls of electricians tape, a battery terminal puller, a pair of wire cutters, two screwdrivers, a file, a can of antiseize, a box end wrench, an adjustible wrench, and a rotary wire brush.” Id. at 160 n. 2.

Similarly, Brewer v. United States, 647 F.2d 1093 , 227 Ct.Cl. 276 (1981), involved more than minor misconduct. There, a Superintendent of Postal Operations made false entries on the time card of a clerk “who was designated timekeeper ... at the post office.” Id. at 1095 . The Court of Claims justified the sanction of dismissal by emphasizing that Brewer “had a position requiring a high degree of honesty and integrity,” and that the Postal Service had a right to expect that Brewer would set a good *595 example — especially when certifying the time card of the person who was responsible for certifying all of the other employees’ time cards. Id. at 1098 .

Finally, Alsbury v. United States Postal Service, 530 F.2d 852 (9th Cir.1976), involved thefts for which Alsbury was criminally prosecuted and for which imprisonment could have resulted. Id. at 853, 855 . Moreover, Alsbury did not even argue on appeal that his punishment was disproportionate to the offense committed. Thus, the issue of the propriety of the punishment was not considered by the court.

In sum, the precedents cited by the majority are easily distinguishable from McClaskey’s case. These precedents do not even begin to justify the harsh penalty imposed here.