United States v. Larry Earl Bryant

Appellant Larry Bryant appeals his conviction on two counts of embezzlement and receipt of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 , contending that he was not brought to trial within the 70-day period provided by the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. We affirm the lower court decision.

The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant be brought to trial

18 U.S.C. § 3161 (c)(1). In calculating this 70-day period, however, a trial court may exclude certain periods of time pursuant to narrowly defined exceptions. Section 3161(h)(8)(A) provides that a court shall exclude

On four occasions — April 20, 1981, July 29, 1981, September 10,1981, and December 14, 1981 — the district court excluded periods of delay pursuant to this section. Bryant concedes that, if the continuances were validly granted, his trial was begun within the 70-day limit, but argues that the continuances were not validly granted.

To justify an “ends of justice” continuance, a district court must set forth “in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with' the majority that a district court need not set forth its findings at the same time it grants a continuance under the Speedy Trial Act. I disagree, however, with the majority’s conclusion that the findings that were set forth in this case are adequate to support such a continuance.

The majority essentially relies on three findings. First, the majority points out that the case involved 135 pre-trial motions. Yet the amount of time required to dispose of such motions is automatically excluded under the Speedy Trial Act from the seventy-day deadline. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (h)(1)(F). The delay resulting from the motions thus cannot also make the case more complex within the meaning of the Act.

Second, the majority notes that the case originally involved five defendants. But Congress cannot have intended the presence of multiple defendants, by itself, to constitute complexity. Otherwise, the statute would not have been drafted to include cases with this number of defendants.

Third, the majority emphasizes that more defendants were added to the case as it progressed and that some óf these defendants were not immediately arraigned.…

726 F.2d 510 UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Larry Earl BRYANT, Defendant-Appellant. No. 82-1675. United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted Sept. 16, 1983. Decided Feb. 17, 1984. As Amended on Denial of Rehearing May 8, 1984. Brian Leighton, Asst. U.S. Atty., Fresno, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee. Margaret A. McKnight, Fresno, Cal., for defendant-appellant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. Before CHOY and NORRIS, Circuit Judges, and NIELSEN, * District Judge. PER CURIAM: 1 Appellant Larry Bryant appeals his conviction on two counts of embezzlement and receipt of government property in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 641 , contending that he was not brought to trial within the 70-day period provided by the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161 et seq. We affirm the lower court decision. 2 The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant be brought to trial 3 within seventy days from the filing date ... of the information or indictment, or from the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending, whichever date last occurs. 4 18…