concurring and dissenting.

I concur in the majority’s rulings sustaining the convictions under Counts II and IV of the indictment, but disagree with the rulings affirming the convictions under Counts I and III of the indictment.

Von Stoll was convicted on four counts related to schemes fashioned by him to defraud. The majority has affirmed all four convictions. This is wrong as to Count I because there was a clear variance between the charge of the indictment and the proof at trial which prejudiced the defendant, and the proof as to Count III was insufficient as a matter of law because the only evidence, Von Stoll’s confession, was entirely lacking in corroboration.

THE INDICTMENT AND SENTENCES

Count I alleged that Von Stoll concocted a scheme by which he would fraudulently represent that he had family trust money available for loans in order to enable him to obtain advance fees from such would-be borrowers; and that between October 22 and 24, 1981, in the execution of the fraud, he “did knowingly and willfully, [sic] transport in interstate and foreign commerce * * $10,000, knowing the same to have been taken by fraud from Ron McCallum,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 . The jury convicted Von Stoll of taking money from a man named Helmut Hofer.

Count II alleged that, in execution of his scheme, Von Stoll transmitted a wire communication (telephone call) between Sacramento, California, and New York State, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 .

Count III alleged that on and between November 24 and November 27, 1981, in execution of his scheme, Von Stoll induced Robert Chester to travel in interstate commerce (to Sacramento), in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 .

Count IV alleged that on or about December 14,1981, in execution of his scheme, Von Stoll transmitted a wire communication (telegram) to Edward Nuno, Jr., in New York, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (incorrectly stated in the indictment as § 2314).

The trial court sentenced Von Stoll to five years in prison on each of Counts I, II, and III, running concurrently. The court suspended imposition of sentence on Count IV and placed him on probation for five years.

This might have been an appropriate case for applying the concurrent sentence doctrine under which an appellate court may decline to review a conviction under one count when it has affirmed a conviction under another count and no adverse collateral legal consequences result from the failure to disturb the unreviewed conviction. See e.g., United States v. Barker, 675 F.2d 1055,1059 (9th Cir.1982). Had the majority applied that doctrine, it might have avoided *589 having to prop up the convictions in Counts I and III by a reasoning process which is incompatible with logic, opposed to precedent, and patently contrary to the record in this case.

Since the majority has instead chosen to put its gloss of approval on these two improper convictions, I must part company and now set forth my reasons for doing so.

COUNT I

The record is very clear that Von Stoll went to the Grand Caymans and there engaged in two separate schemes involving Hofer and McCallum. In one, Von Stoll negotiated a 1.2 million dollar loan with McCallum and Hofer for financing the purchase of equipment for a recording studio which they operated as partners. This took place on the morning of October 21, in the preseneé of Hofer, McCallum, and De-Freeze, their attorney. No money passed at that time. Because of Von Stoll’s indisposition, the deal was put over to the following morning when they shook hands to seal the bargain.

Meanwhile, Von Stoll privately asked Hofer to meet with him alone, on the morning of October 22, to discuss an “additional loan” of $1.5 million for the production of films. This was a separate transaction in which no participation by McCallum or the partnership was indicated. Von Stoll drew up a contract between himself and Hofer, alone, which provided,

Pursuant to this arrangement, Hofer paid Von Stoll $10,000 from Hofer’s own personal account. He treated this transaction as his sole responsibility. When asked at the trial to explain whose funds were involved, he answered:

The foregoing constitutes the evidence identifying the person defrauded. Whether Hofer might later have recouped his $10,000 out of the $1.5 million loan, had it been obtained, does not change the fact that at that time the funds were Hofer’s, not McCallum’s, nor the partnership’s. The majority unfortunately has left an unfounded impression in its language (“[T]he proof showed it was taken from Hofer, McCal-lum’s partner.”). Maj. Op. at 586. While the quoted language does not explicitly state that the money was partnership money, and hence could technically be said to belong to McCallum as well as to Hofer, such is its unqualified inference and that inference is simply contrary to the testimony.

The majority opinion is also incorrect in its effort to distinguish this case from the principle enunciated in Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 , 80 S.Ct. 270 , 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). What the majority opinion describes as a “simple” variance in fact is a major defect in the proof. The contention that this case presents “but one set of facts with a single divergence: the identity of the person * * * defrauded,” Maj. op. at 586, is unfounded. Hofer’s $1.5 million transaction was wholly different from the $1.2 million deal in which all the parties had participated. The majority’s purported distinction of Stirone betrays a regrettable misconception of both fact and law.

Nor can I agree with the conclusion that the failure to try Von Stoll only on the charge presented in the indictment was not prejudicial. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 558 , 23 L.Ed. 588 (1876); United States v. Buckner, 610 F.2d 570, 573 (9th Cir.1979), cert, denied, 445 U.S. 961 , 100 S.Ct. 1646 , 64 L.Ed.2d 235 (1980). The majority’s rationale is premised on the theory that the name of the defrauded person need not be pleaded in order to state an offense. *590 While an indictment charging interstate or foreign transportation of money taken by fraud may be sufficient, in a proper case, without naming the person defrauded, that is so only when the fraudulent transaction is, by time, place, circumstances, or other details, fairly implicated so that notice is reasonably imported. This would be true where only a single nucleus of facts is established. But where the allegations focus on one of several distinct transactions and charge specified conduct as the offense, it will not do to adduce at trial other, uncharged, fraudulent conduct. That is what the Supreme Court has told us in Stirone :

Stirone, 361 U.S. at 218 , 80 S.Ct. at 274 .

This sensible rule requires that the proof adhere to the grand jury’s indictment and that fair notice of the conduct in suit be given to the accused so that he may defend, and so that he cannot again be tried for the same conduct. Neither requirement was met here. Von Stoll’s conviction could not rest on the proof which the Government presented. 1

COUNT III

Count III charged that, having devised a scheme to defraud, and in furtherance of that scheme, Von Stoll induced Robert Chester to travel to Sacramento. Government Agent Biniek testified that on two separate occasions Von Stoll admitted to him that he had caused Chester to come to Sacramento and stay at the Red Lion Inn. Chester did not testify, and no documentation whatsoever established that he had in fact done the travel claimed.

As “independent corroboration,” the Government offered the facts that Chester had been in the Grand Caymans, had met with Von Stoll (both facts independently established), and there was in evidence a $10,000 payment order issued by a San Francisco bank. From this sparse presentation, the majority finds corroboration. That is patently unsound. The payment order corroborates nothing. It was not drawn in California, but was- cabled to the San Francisco bank from Canada. It does not purport to show anyone’s travel to Sacramento — or to any other place. No one ever put Chester in Sacramento. There is simply no testimony, no evidence, and no reasonable inferences showing any travel by Chester at or near the times alleged, let alone any induced by Von Stoll.

The majority, after summarizing the scant evidence purporting to support Count III, and recounting the unenlightening facts which took place in the Caymans, has concluded: “All of this evidence suffices ‘to establish that the self incriminating declarations are trustworthy.’ ” (Citing United States v. Allen, 455 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1972)). Conceding that none of that evidence showed any travel by Chester, the majority says: “[t]he lack of corroboration for the specific element that Von Stoll induced Chester to travel to Sacramento does not invalidate the conviction on Count III because the Government produced sufficient evidence to support the truth of the confessions as a whole.”

This statement suggests-that if independent evidence is sufficient to corroborate a confession in some particulars, as to some claims, it is not necessary that an entirely separate claim be separately supported. This incorrect statement is not and never has been the law. The truth is that Count III ought not have to have been allowed to go to the jury and we have no business upholding that conviction on this appeal.

The majority seems not to have realized that none of the facts of Count III were set forth in Von Stoll’s written confessions, but came solely from Agent Biniek’s testimony *591 of Von Stoll’s oral statements to him. There. were not, as the majority claims, “many witnesses,” no corroboration of Count III “extensively,” or in any respect. Count III should never have been allowed to get to the jury, and we should not uphold it on this appeal.

The sad fact is that the prosecution seems to have been unprepared to put its case together. We do not know on any firsthand basis what McCallum told the prosecution, or what facts were available to the grand jury. We do know that neither McCallum nor Chester appeared at trial. At oral argument Government counsel suggested that trial calendar problems might have handicapped preparation which a continuance might have averted. That may tend to explain the glaring deficiencies of this case. But whatever the reason, one is left with the unhappy feeling that, at least on Counts I and III, even a confessed swindler was entitled to fare better in a court of law.

. The analysis here does not rely upon United States v. Mastelotto, 717 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1983), and United States v. Miller, 715 F.2d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1983). Those cases hold that there is an impermissible variance if the defendant is convicted on a scheme narrower than that presented in the indictment if it is not clear that the grand jury would have returned an indictment on the narrower ground. I believe their reasoning to be unsound and do not incorporate or embrace it herein.