United States v. Didier De Nier

MEMORANDUM *

Didier De Nier was convicted of five counts of wire fraud and one count of conspiracy to defraud the government in connection with the production of fraudulent batteries that De Nier’s company, Powerline, sold to the Department of Defense (“DOD”) to put in naval warships. As the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.

1. De Nier contests three of the district court’s evidentiary rulings—(1) sustaining the government’s hearsay objection that prevented De Nier from denying that he had confessed to knowingly participating in Powerline’s fraud, (2) allowing the prosecutor to interject his own credibility at trial by referencing his conversation with De Nier, and (3) admitting into evidence an email advertisement that De Nier had forwarded to a co-conspirator for “the most dangerous book in the world.” Assuming the district court erred in its evi-dentiary rulings (and it likely did), and that the errors reached constitutional dimension, the errors were harmless.

Under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), where a trial error results in the infringement of a constitutional right, the government…

dissenting:

I disagree that the refusal to let De Nier refute his supposed confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to testify in his own defense: this right is “essential to due process of law in a fair adversary system,” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 62 , 107 S.Ct. 2704 , 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987) (citation omitted), and is violated when a trial court “arbitrarily excludes material portions” of the defendant’s testimony, id. at 55 , 107 S.Ct. 2704 . De Nier was denied his only means of disproving that he had confessed to the crimes of which he was accused. As the Supreme Court has instructed, “confessions have profound impact on the jury”; a confession is “probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted” against him at trial because it comes from the defendant himself. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 , 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (citations omitted). Therefore, although there was other evidence presented by the government of De Nier’s guilt, I cannot conclude that no reasonable juror would have relied on De Nier’s uncontested confession in finding him guilty.

facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.

1. De Nier contests three of the district court’s evidentiary rulings – (1)

sustaining the government’s hearsay objection that prevented De Nier from

denying that he had confessed to knowingly participating in Powerline’s fraud, (2)

allowing the prosecutor to interject his own credibility at trial by referencing his

conversation with De Nier, and (3) admitting into evidence an email

advertisement that De Nier had forwarded to a co-conspirator for “the most

dangerous book in the world.” Assuming the district court erred in its evidentiary

rulings (and it likely did), and that the errors reached constitutional dimension, the

errors were harmless.

Under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), where a trial error

results in the infringement of a constitutional right, the government bears the

burden to “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not

contribute to the verdict obtained.” The court must decide whether a reasonable

juror could have relied on the error in deciding the verdict. An error potentially

infringing constitutional rights is harmless and does not require automatic reversal

of…