22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T513,MEMORANDUM Michael P. darken appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action alleging employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because darken failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions were pretextual. See Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th.Cir. 1998) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden shifting to Rehabilitation Act claim); Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075 , 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[M]ere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment.”). The district court did not abuse its discretion by considering defendants’ state ment of facts. See L.R. Civ. 56.1(a); United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Only in rare cases will we question the exercise of discretion in connection with the application of, local rules.”). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T545,

MEMORANDUM

Michael P. darken appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his action alleging employment discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Walton v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 492 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir. 2007), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because darken failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for their actions were pretextual. See Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1175 (9th.Cir. 1998) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden shifting to Rehabilitation Act claim); Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075 , 1081-82 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[M]ere allegation and speculation do not create a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment.”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by considering defendants’ state ment of facts. See L.R. Civ. 56.1(a); United States v. Warren, 601 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Only in rare cases will we question the exercise of discretion in connection with the application of, local rules.”).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.