22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4f5,MEMORANDUM Mark F. Spangler appeals pro se from the district court’s default judgment in the government’s civil enforcement action alleging violations of the Investment Advis-ors Act of 1940 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review for abuse of discretion, NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government’s motion for default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth factors for determining whether to enter default judgment). The district court did not err in considering the impact of Spangler’s criminal conviction on its evaluation of the default judgment factors. See Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc,, 505 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] final judgment retains its collateral estoppel effect, if any, while pending appeal.”). We do not consider arguments that were not presented to the district court. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T527,

MEMORANDUM

Mark F. Spangler appeals pro se from the district court’s default judgment in the government’s civil enforcement action alleging violations of the Investment Advis-ors Act of 1940 and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review for abuse of discretion, NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 616 (9th Cir. 2016), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government’s motion for default judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), See Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (setting forth factors for determining whether to enter default judgment). The district court did not err in considering the impact of Spangler’s criminal conviction on its evaluation of the default judgment factors. See Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc,, 505 F.3d 874, 882 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[A] final judgment retains its collateral estoppel effect, if any, while pending appeal.”).

We do not consider arguments that were not presented to the district court. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.