22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T50c,MEMORANDUM Peter Barclay appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising from an unfavorable judgment by the Oregon state court in a prior family law action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo both the dismissal of an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), and under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed Barclay’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it amounted to a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a state court judgment and raised claims that were “inextricably intertwined” with that state court judgment. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65 . We reject as without merit Barclay’s contentions regarding the applicability of exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T53e,

MEMORANDUM

Peter Barclay appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising from an unfavorable judgment by the Oregon state court in a prior family law action. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo both the dismissal of an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e), Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), and under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Barclay’s action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because it amounted to a forbidden “de facto appeal” of a state court judgment and raised claims that were “inextricably intertwined” with that state court judgment. See Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163-65 . We reject as without merit Barclay’s contentions regarding the applicability of exceptions to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.