MEMORANDUM

Kareem Muhammad appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1988 action alleging excessive force, unlawful arrest, and related state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly concluded that Muhammad’s action was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 , 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), because a judgment in Muhammad’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1). See Heck, 512 U.S. at 487 , 114 S.Ct. 2364 (§ 1983 action that necessarily implies the invalidity of plaintiffs conviction must be dismissed unless the conviction has been invalidated); Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689 , 699 n.5 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“[A] jury’s verdict necessarily determines the lawfulness of the officers’ actions throughout the whole course of the defendant’s conduct, and any action alleging the use of excessive force would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction.” (citations, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)); Yount v. City of Sacramento, 43 Cal.4th 885 , 76 Cal.Rptr.3d 787 , 183 P.3d 471, 484 (2008) (California applies Heck principles to state law claims).

We construe the district court’s summary judgment as dismissing the action without prejudice. See Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1025 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissals under Heck are without prejudice).

We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

AFFIRMED.

'j'jjg disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.