22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T492,MEMORANDUM Juliet Arvakhi appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her Title VII action alleging hostile work environment and retaliation claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Arvakhi’s hostile work environment claim because Arvakhi failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s alleged conduct was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment. See Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (elements of a Title VII hostile work environment claim). The district court properly granted summary judgment on Arvakhi’s retaliation claim because Arvakhi failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she suffered an adverse action as a result of engaging in protected activity. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 646 (elements of a Title VII retaliation claim). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T4c4,

MEMORANDUM

Juliet Arvakhi appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her Title VII action alleging hostile work environment and retaliation claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Arvakhi’s hostile work environment claim because Arvakhi failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant’s alleged conduct was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment. See Manatt v. Bank of Am., 339 F.3d 792, 798 (9th Cir. 2003) (elements of a Title VII hostile work environment claim).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Arvakhi’s retaliation claim because Arvakhi failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she suffered an adverse action as a result of engaging in protected activity. See Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 646 (elements of a Title VII retaliation claim).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.