MEMORANDUM

Genesther Taylor appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her employment action alleging Title VII and state law claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo the district court’s dismissal on the basis of the applicable statute of limitations. Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed as time-barred Taylor’s Title VII claims because Taylor filed this action years after the applicable statute of limitations had run. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~5(f)(1) (statute of limitations for Title VII action is ninety days from receipt of a right-to-sue letter); O’Donnell v. Vencor Inc., 466 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2006) (Title VII claims are not equitably tolled during the pendency of a related action, where the related action is commenced after the ninety-day statute of limitations has run).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Taylor’s state law claims after dismissing her federal claims. See Acri v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 114 F.3d 999, 1001 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors ... will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining, state-law claims.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Costanich v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 627 F.3d 1101 , 1107 (9th Cir. 2010) (standard of review). We treat the dismissal of the state law claims as a dismissal without prejudice. See Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (‘When ... the court dismisses the federal claim leaving only state claims for resolution, the court should de cline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss them without prejudice.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)).

Because we affirm the dismissal of Taylor’s action as time-barred, we do not consider Taylor’s contentions regarding the merits of her claims. ■

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.