MEMORANDUM

Prisoner Robert Alexander brought suit against several prison personnel alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Alexander appealed the grant of summary judgment to four of the defendants: Dr, Gulick, Dr. Hansen, Dr. Shelton, and Nurse Gruenwald (collectively, “Defendants”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we affirm.

A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, with the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004).

To succeed on a claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment, “a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 , 97 S.Ct. 285 , 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). The plaintiff must show more than “a difference of medical opinion”; instead, he must show that the defendant’s conduct was “medically unacceptable under the circumstances” and that the defendant consciously disregarded the excessive risk to the plaintiffs health. Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir. 1996).

There is no evidence that Defendants recognized Alexander’s need for treatment and yet acted with deliberate indifference to that need. Instead, the evidence shows that Alexander received constant or near-constant treatment during the time period at issue. Defendants prescribed medication, pursued testing, requested consultations, and ordered a variety of treatments to help Alexander. Alexander has not presented evidence to suggest that the treatment he received was medically unacceptable. Alexander’s reliance on Snow v. McDaniel, 681 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2012), overruled on other grounds by Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc), to demonstrate that Dr. Gulick acted with deliberate indifference in deciding to reduce Alexander’s Neurontin dosage is unavailing; unlike in Snow , there is no evidence that the challenged treatment de- cisión was medically inappropriate. See id. at 990 (reversing a grant of summary judgment to a physician’s assistant when he had denied plaintiff pain medication but a doctor reviewing the decision, later “totally disagree^!]”).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.