22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T523,MEMORANDUM Appellant Roxsanna Ryan appeals the district court’s reversal of the bankruptcy court order granting Debtor Warren Charles Bodeker’s motion to rescind his waiver of a homestead exemption which Bodeker agreed to as part of a stipulation. We affirm. First, Law v. Siegel is not a subsequent change in the law applicable to this case because no court equitably surcharged Bo-deker’s homestead. See — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188 , 188 L.Ed.2d 146, 1194-97 (2014). Even if Siegel applied, a subsequent change in law generally does not provide a basis for a party to rescind a stipulation. In re Marriage of Grace, 198 Mont. 97 , 643 P.2d 1188, 1191-92 (1982); see also Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753 , 759 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “enforcement of settlement agreements [is] governed by principles of local law”). Second, 11 U.S.C. § 522 (e) only applies to the waiver of an exemption in favor of a creditor with an “unsecured claim.” Trustee-Appellee Christy L. Brandon is neither an unsecured creditor nor holds an unsecured claim. Any incidental benefit to Bo-deker’s creditors as a result of the stipulation does not render § 522(e) applicable to this case. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T555,

MEMORANDUM

Appellant Roxsanna Ryan appeals the district court’s reversal of the bankruptcy court order granting Debtor Warren Charles Bodeker’s motion to rescind his waiver of a homestead exemption which Bodeker agreed to as part of a stipulation. We affirm.

First, Law v. Siegel is not a subsequent change in the law applicable to this case because no court equitably surcharged Bo-deker’s homestead. See — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 1188 , 188 L.Ed.2d 146, 1194-97 (2014). Even if Siegel applied, a subsequent change in law generally does not provide a basis for a party to rescind a stipulation. In re Marriage of Grace, 198 Mont. 97 , 643 P.2d 1188, 1191-92 (1982); see also Jeff D. v. Andrus, 899 F.2d 753 , 759 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that “enforcement of settlement agreements [is] governed by principles of local law”).

Second, 11 U.S.C. § 522 (e) only applies to the waiver of an exemption in favor of a creditor with an “unsecured claim.” Trustee-Appellee Christy L. Brandon is neither an unsecured creditor nor holds an unsecured claim. Any incidental benefit to Bo-deker’s creditors as a result of the stipulation does not render § 522(e) applicable to this case.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.