22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T522,MEMORANDUM California state prisoner Shau-Ron Sykes appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C, § 1983 action arising from an alleged rape and assault in Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C, § 1291. We review de novo. Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Watison v. Canter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)). We vacate and remand,. The district court determined that Sykes’ claims were time-barred and that Sykes is not entitled to equitable tolling. However, the district court failed to consider whether the statute of limitation should be tolled because Sykes “lack[ed] the legal capacity to make decisions” at the time the claims accrued. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 352(a); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 , 127 S.Ct. 1091 , 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (“We have generally referred to state law for tolling rules, just as we have for the length of statutes of limitations.”). Therefore, we vacate and remand for the district court to consider this question in the first instance, VACATED and REMANDED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T54f,

MEMORANDUM

California state prisoner Shau-Ron Sykes appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C, § 1983 action arising from an alleged rape and assault in Los Angeles County Men’s Central Jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C, § 1291. We review de novo. Belanus v. Clark, 796 F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Watison v. Canter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)). We vacate and remand,.

The district court determined that Sykes’ claims were time-barred and that Sykes is not entitled to equitable tolling. However, the district court failed to consider whether the statute of limitation should be tolled because Sykes “lack[ed] the legal capacity to make decisions” at the time the claims accrued. Cal. Civ. Proc. § 352(a); see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 394 , 127 S.Ct. 1091 , 166 L.Ed.2d 973 (2007) (“We have generally referred to state law for tolling rules, just as we have for the length of statutes of limitations.”). Therefore, we vacate and remand for the district court to consider this question in the first instance,

VACATED and REMANDED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.