MEMORANDUM

James Leroy Herrington, an Oregon state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. We-have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Toguohi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004), and we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

Dismissal of Herrington’s action was proper because Herrington failed to allege facts sufficient to show that defendants were deliberately indifferent to his broken foot. See Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057-60 (a prison official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she disregards an excessive risk to inmate health; a difference of opinion concerning the course of treatment, medical malpractice, or negligence in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not amount to deliberate indifference).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by declining to consider Herring-ton’s unauthenticated documents as evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. See Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and stating that “unauthenticated documents cannot be. considered in a motion for summary judgment”).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Herrington’s motions for appointment of counsel because Her-rington did not demonstrate any exceptional circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth “exceptional circumstances” requirement for appointment of counsel).

We do not consider issues raised by Herrington in his brief, that are not supported by argument. See Acosta-Huerta v. Estelle, 7 F.3d 139, 144 (9th Cir. 1992).

AFFIRMED.

Th.iS disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.