MEMORANDUM

We lack jurisdiction to consider the Power District’s arguments based on Arizona Revised Statutes section 12-820.01. That section establishes an immunity against claims for damages, but not against claims for injunctive relief. Allied-Signal, Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 182 F.3d 692, 697 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Zeigler v. Kirschner, 162 Ariz. 77 , 781 P.2d 54, 61 (1989)). SolarCity’s claims for antitrust damages were dismissed, and neither it nor the Power District has appealed that decision. SolarCity also abandoned its previously asserted claim for tort damages in favor of an earlier trial. Thus, section 12-820.01 can become relevant only after judgment is entered, if at all—for example, if SolarCity eventually appeals the district court’s order dismissing its damages claims. The Power District’s current appeal of the issue is thus not ripe. See, e.g., Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 , 130 S.Ct. 599 , 175 L.Ed.2d 458 (2009) (emphasizing that a collateral order can be appealed only if review would be ineffective after final judgment); Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 , 118 S.Ct. 1257 , 140 L.Ed.2d 406 (1998) (“A claim is not ripe for adjudication if it rests upon ‘contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all’ ” (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 , 105 S.Ct. 3325 , 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985))).

Lastly, as to the filed-rate doctrine, the Power District argues only that we have pendent jurisdiction to consider its appeal. We cannot have pendent jurisdiction without appellate jurisdiction over some other matter—which we lack for the reasons stated above and in our concurrently filed opinion.

DISMISSED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by,Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. . The Power District's motion for judicial notice is accordingly denied as moot.