22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T519,MEMORANDUM Peli Popovich Hunt appeals pro se from a judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying the corporate debt- or’s claimed exemptions. We have jurisdiction under ' 28 U.S.C. § 158 (d). We review de novo decisions of the BAP and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010). To the extent Hunt is challenging the bankruptcy court’s order as the representative of a trust or the corporate debtor, the appeal is dismissed because Hunt, as a non-attorney, “has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than [herjself.” C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987). To the extent Hunt is challenging the bankruptcy court’s order directly as an individual, the appeal is dismissed because Hunt is not a “person aggrieved” by the bankruptcy court’s order and, therefore, lacks standing to prosecute the appeal. See Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1999). DISMISSED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T54b,

MEMORANDUM

Peli Popovich Hunt appeals pro se from a judgment of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) affirming the bankruptcy court’s order denying the corporate debt- or’s claimed exemptions. We have jurisdiction under ' 28 U.S.C. § 158 (d). We review de novo decisions of the BAP and apply the same standard of review that the BAP applied to the bankruptcy court’s ruling. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Penrod (In re Penrod), 611 F.3d 1158, 1160 (9th Cir. 2010).

To the extent Hunt is challenging the bankruptcy court’s order as the representative of a trust or the corporate debtor, the appeal is dismissed because Hunt, as a non-attorney, “has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than [herjself.” C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697-98 (9th Cir. 1987).

To the extent Hunt is challenging the bankruptcy court’s order directly as an individual, the appeal is dismissed because Hunt is not a “person aggrieved” by the bankruptcy court’s order and, therefore, lacks standing to prosecute the appeal. See Duckor Spradling & Metzger v. Baum Trust (In re P.R.T.C., Inc.), 177 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1999).

DISMISSED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.