facts as alleged in the complaint establish probable cause to prosecute. The

Cairnses’ argue only that there was no probable cause to prosecute, because since

“self-defense was alleged in the Complaint, probable cause was not shown to

exist.” However, “[t]he mere existence of some evidence that could suggest self-

defense does not negate probable cause.” Yousefian v. City of Glendale, 779 F.3d

1010, 1014 (9th Cir. 2015).

To establish the malice element, we look to whether the proceeding was

“instituted primarily for an improper purpose.” Tucker, 515 F.3d at 1030 (citing

Sierra Club Found. v. Graham, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 726, 739-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).

The only hint of malice in the complaint is the bare allegation that the district

attorney “unfairly and unlawfully” prosecuted Kevin. This conclusory allegation is

insufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).

3 The Cairnses allege that, if granted leave to amend, they would “state[] more

specifically” that Kevin’s actions were taken in self-defense, and they would argue

Kevin would not have been prosecuted had the Sheriff’s Office not “intentionally

refused to interview exculpatory witnesses” and “intentionally failed to collect the

surveillance videos and submit them to the prosecution.” The Cairnses’ proposed

amendments “could not possibly cure the deficienc[ies]” in the complaint. DeSoto

v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).

Therefore, the district court properly dismissed the claim without leave to amend,

because amendment would have been futile. Id.

2. “In order to establish liability for governmental entities under Monell, a

plaintiff must prove: (1) that the plaintiff possessed a constitutional right of which

he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts

to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4) that the

policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Doughterty v. City

of Covina, 654 F.3d 892, 900 (9th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks, citation, and

alterations omitted). Because the district court properly dismissed the malicious

prosecution claim, the Monell claim necessarily fails because there is no

underlying constitutional violation.

AFFIRMED.

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