22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4a3,MEMORANDUM Margaret Ann Haughton appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her Title VII action alleging a retaliation claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment on Haughton’s retaliatory hostile work environment claim because Haughton failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she was subjected to conduct that was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (“To determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T4d0,

MEMORANDUM

Margaret Ann Haughton appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in her Title VII action alleging a retaliation claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Haughton’s retaliatory hostile work environment claim because Haughton failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she was subjected to conduct that was severe or pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000) (“To determine whether an environment is sufficiently hostile, we look to the totality of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.