MEMORANDUM

Andre Hoskins appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his action alleging various federal claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo a dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Lukovsky v. City & County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1047 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Hoskins’ action as time-barred, because Hoskins filed this action years after the applicable statute of limitations had run. See 17 U.S.C. § 507 (b) (three year statute of limitations for copyright infringement claims); Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001) (four year statute of limitations for civil Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organization claims); see also Wash. Rev. Code § 4.16.080 (2) (three year statute of limitations for personal injury claims); Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133 , 1137 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (for claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, courts apply the statute of limitations for the most analogous state law); McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673-74 (9th Cir. 1991) (§ 1983 and § 1985 claims are governed by forum state’s statute of limitations for personal injury actions).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hoskins’ motion to compel interrogatories. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth standard of review and describing trial court’s broad discretion to deny discovery).

We do not consider documents and facts not presented to the district court. See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Documents or facts not presented to the district court are not part of the record on appeal.”).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.