OPINION

This interlocutory appeal arises from the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for Tucson police officers Allan Meyer and Robert Soeder (“Defendants”) from Plaintiffs claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unconstitutional seizures and use of excessive force. The claims stem from the officers’ warrantless entry into a vacant apartment and use of deadly force on Michael Duncklee, who aggressively attacked them while growling and brandishing a broken hockey stick inside the apartment.

Because the district court erroneously denied Defendants qualified immunity regarding both the warrantless entry into the apartment and the use of force on Duncklee, we reverse and remand.

L FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

As stated by the district court, “[t]his case presents an unusual circumstance in which the facts are largely undisputed,” and as acknowledged by Plaintiff, “[v]ery little is disputed, and certainly nothing that is significant.” Answering Brief at 2 (ECF No. 21). The district court summarized the facts of the case as follows:

Order, Woodward v. City of Tucson, No. 15-00077, at 2-5 (D. Ariz. Mar. 31, 2016) (alterations in original).

Duncklee’s mother, Irma Woodward (“Plaintiff’), brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Officer Meyer, Officer Soeder, and the City of Tucson. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully entering the apartment and using excessive force against Duncklee. Defendants asserted that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.

The district court denied Defendants’ motion and granted Plaintiffs motion in part. First, the district court found that while Duncklee likely did not have standing to challenge the seizure of the apartment, he did have standing to challenge the seizure of his person and, thus, could “allege that Officers Meyer and Soeder violated [his] Fourth Amendment rights by entering the apartment.”

Next, the court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Meyer and Soeder were not entitled to qualified immunity for either their war-rantless seizure of the apartment or their use of force on Duncklee. As to the war-rantless seizure claim, the district court concluded that Defendants’ warrantless entry into the apartment violated the Fourth Amendment and that Defendants had failed to show the entry was reasonable in light of exigent circumstances or consent to enter. As a result, the court determined that Meyer and Soeder were not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. The district court did not address whether Duncklee or Watts had standing to raise a Fourth Amendment privacy violation regarding the warrantless entry and seizure of the apartment.

Relying upon the since-abrogated provocation theory from Alexander v. City and County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994), abrogated by County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1539 , 198 L.Ed.2d 52 (2017), the district court also determined that Plaintiffs excessive force claim turned on the force Defendants used in entering the apartment and concluded that “it was clearly established as a matter of law that drawing their guns and letting themselves into the apartment violated a constitutional right to be free from excessive force.” Thus, the court found that Defendants were also not entitled to qualified immunity for this claim.

The district court next granted in part and denied in part Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. As with its qualified immunity analysis, the court found that the warrantless seizure of the apartment was a Fourth Amendment violation since there were neither exigent circumstances nor proper consent to enter. Thus, the court granted Plaintiffs motion on this issue. However, the court denied the motion as to the excessive force claim, finding that there were outstanding factual issues. In considering the facts relevant to the excessive force claim, the district court again focused on Defendants’ actions relating to the warrantless entry.

Defendants appeal the district court’s denial of qualified immunity for both the warrantless entry into the apartment and the use of force against Duncklee. They also appeal the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment for Plaintiff as to the unreasonableness of the warrantless entry.

II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the collateral order doctrine, this court has jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of qualified immunity under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). Moreover, on an interlocutory appeal such as this one, we may exercise “[pjendent appellate jurisdiction ... over issues that ordinarily may not be reviewed on interlocutory appeal” so long as those issues are “inextricably intertwined” with “other issues properly before the court.” Cunningham v. Gates, 229 F.3d 1271, 1284 (9th Cir. 2000). Because the district court’s grant of partial summary judgment for Plaintiff as to the unreasonableness of the Defendants’ entry into the apartment is “inextricably intertwined” with its denial of qualified immunity for that entry, we have jurisdiction to review the grant of summary judgment.

A district court’s decision to grant or deny summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is reviewed de novo. See Garcia v. Cty. of Merced, 639 F.3d 1206, 1208 (9th Cir. 2011); Davis v. City of Las Vegas, 478 F.3d 1048, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). So is a district court’s decision to grant in part a party’s motion for summary judgment. White v. City of Sparks, 500 F.3d 953, 955 (9th Cir. 2007). Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, this court must determine whether there are any genuine disputes as to any material facts and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. See Mueller v. Auker, 576 F.3d 979, 991 (9th Cir. 2009).

III. DISCUSSION

All of the district court’s conclusions rest on the premise that Duncklee deserved constitutional protections because of his presence within the vacant apartment. Because Duncklee had no reasonable expectation of privacy while trespassing in the apartment, we reverse its denial of qualified immunity regarding the warrantless entry and seizure of the apartment. We also reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity regarding the seizure of and use of force on Duncklee, as it was not clearly established that the Defendants’ actions violated a constitutional right. Finally, we reverse the district court’s partial grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff.

A. Plaintiffs/Duncklee’s Fourth Amendment Standing

Plaintiff obviously has standing to assert Fourth Amendment violations as to Duncklee’s seizure and the use of force against him. However, Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a Fourth Amendment violation for the warrantless entry and seizure of the vacant apartment. See Lyall v. City of Los Angeles, 807 F.3d 1178, 1186 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that cannot be asserted vicariously and remarking that “when police trespass bn property to carry out a search, a defendant has standing to raise the Fourth Amendment only if it was his person, house, paper, or effect searched”). Although the district court acknowledged that “because Mr. Duncklee is not alleged to have any sufficient ownership or possessory rights in the apartment, he may not have standing to challenge the search of the apartment,” it nevertheless found that Duncklee could assert rights regarding the apartment.

Plaintiff recognizes that any privacy rights Duncklee had in the apartment must stem from his relationship with Watts, the. former tenant who was in the apartment with him. Plaintiff describes Duncklee as an overnight guest of Watts, who Plaintiff assumes retained her rights as a tenant. If Duncklee was an overnight guest, and if Watts retained tenant rights, then Plaintiff would have standing to pursue a violation of Duncklee’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights as a result, of Defendants’ warrantless entry into the apartment. See Espinosa v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 598 F.3d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 2010) (“An overnight guest in a home staying with the permission of the host has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment,”).

However, Watts had no privacy rights to assign to Duncklee. Zimmerman v. Bishop Estate, 25 F.3d 784, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a house guest of a squatter has no greater right to be on the property than does the squatter), superseded on other grounds as recognized by Margolis v. Ryan, 140 F.3d 850, 854-55 (9th Cir. 1998). Although Plaintiff couches the case as being of a civil landlord/tenant nature, the reality is that Watts was a trespasser, as she had been evicted from the property.

One who has been formally evicted has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her previous residence. United States v. Struckman, 603 F.3d 731, 747 (9th Cir. 2010) (providing that a trespasser cannot claim Fourth Amendment protections); United States v. Young, 573 F.3d 711, 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that “because the hotel did not actually evict [the defendant], he maintáined a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room,” and explaining that “[b]eing arrested is different from being evicted, and being’ arrested does not automatically destroy [a] person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in his home”); United States v. Bautista, 362 F.3d 584, 590 (9th Cir. 2004) (providing that “unless his occupancy'had been lawfully terminated when the police conducted their search, [the defendant] retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in the room”); Zimmerman, 25 F.3d at 787 (concluding that squatters have' no reasonable expectation of privacy); Klee v. United States, 53 F.2d 58, 59 (9th Cir. 1931) (providing that" trespassers “cannot claim the benefit of the Fourth Amendment”). Even though Watts had not removed all of her personal property from the apartment, she had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment on the night of May 21, 2014. Indeed, as Plaintiff acknowledged in her answering brief, Watts had been formally evicted, her key had been taken away, and she had made an appointment for several days later to re-enter the apartment to obtain her property.

Because the undisputed evidence shows that Watts was aware of her eviction, this case differs from situations where the individuals'claiming privacy rights either did not know they had been evicted or claimed that' they still had tenancy rights. See Young, 573 F.3d at 716-17 ; King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1986) (providing that individuals who had been paying'rent and'were claiming tenancy rights-during a landlord/tenant'dispute had Fourth. Amendment protections in connection with a warrantless search of their apartment, the seizure of their personal property, and their warrantless arrests). In that she had been evicted and locked out, Watts had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment.

Like Plaintiff, the district court appears to have erroneously viewed this case through a landlord/tenant lens. All of the cases relied upon by the court involve situations where the aggrieved individuals resided in the domiciles' at issue and had reasonable expectations of privacy. For example, the district court asserted that “[t]he facts of this case are substantively indistinguishable from those in King and Frunz [v. City of Tacoma, 468 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2006)].” Both of these cases involve warrantless searches, lack of the residents’ consent to search, and their Fourth Amendment rights arising from the searches. As stated, King involved a landlord/tenant dispute in which the tenants had been paying rent arid were claiming tenant rights. 782 F.2d at 826, 828 . In Frunz, the plaintiff owned the home that was searched. 468 F.3d at 1142 . Thus, both of these cases are distinguishable from the present case in that the plaintiffs in those two cases either had property rights or at least made claims, supported by evidence, that they had such rights.

In conclusion, the district court’s analysis of this case rests on a faulty premise, as Duncklee had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment on the, night he was shot by Defendants. Minnesota v. Carter, 626 U.S. 83 , 88, 119 S.Ct. 469 , 142 L.Ed.2d 373 (1998) (explaining that the aggrieved “must demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that his expectation is reasonable”). Thus, Plaintiff has no standing to assert a Fourth. Amendment claim on this basis. '

B. Qualified Immunity Regarding the Seizure of the Apartment

The district court began its analysis of Defendants’ qualified immunity claim regarding the seizure of the apartment by stating that “[o]fficers Meyer and Soeder did not have a . warrant when they opened the door to and entered the apartment.” It then explained that “ ‘[i]t is axiomatic that the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.’ ” Id. (quoting Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 , 104 S.Ct. 2091 , 80 L.Ed.2d 732 (1984)). The court simply assumed that the apartment was “home”' for-Watts and, presumably by her permission, for Duncklee. As discussed above, under the- uncontested facts of this case, this conclusion is legally untenable.

Whether qualified immunity is warranted involves a two part inquiry: (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff make out a violation'of a constitutional right and (2)' if so, whether the right was “clearly established” at the time'of the defendant’s alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 655 U.S. 223 , 232, 129 S.Ct. 808 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). In that Duncklee had no reasonable expectation of privacy-in the apartment, Plaintiff cannot establish that Defendants violated ’ Duncklee’s Fourth Amendment rights by entering the apartment' without a warrant. Thus, the first inquiry of the qualified immunity test is not satisfied and the - district court’s decision to deny qualified immunity regarding this claim must be reversed,

C. Qualified Immunity Regarding the Seizure of and Use of Force on Duncklee

The district court, in denying qualified immunity to Defendants as to the seizure of and use of force on Duncklee, relied on its previous conclusion that the warrant-less entry violated Duncklee’s constitutional rights and, thus, everything that occurred thereafter was part of that initial violation. Citing the provocation theory from Alexander, the court remarked that Plaintiff’s “ ‘excessive force claim turns on the force the officers .used in entering the [apartment],’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Alexander, 29 F.3d at 1366 n.12), and concluded that “it was clearly established as a matter of law that drawing their guns and letting themselves into the apartment violated a constitutional right to be free from excessive force.”

The provocation theory was succinctly recited in Billington v. Smith, which held that under Alexander,

292 F.3d 1177 , 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) (alterations omitted) (quoting Alexander, 29 F.3d at 1366 ). However, in County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, — U.S. -, 137 S.Ct. 1539 , 198 L.Ed.2d 52 (2017), decided after the district court’s opinion in this case, the Supreme Court abrogated Billington and the provocation theory. The Supreme Court concluded that the provocation theory was incompatible with established federal excessive force jurisprudence and held that an earlier “Fourth Amendment violation cannot transform a later, reasonable use of force into an unreasonable seizure.” Id. at 1544 . The Court recognized that the provocation theory conflated distinct Fourth Amendment violations and held that the objective reasonableness of each search or seizure must be analyzed separately. Id. at 1547 . In light of Mendez, the district court erred in relying on the provocation theory.

The question before this court, then, is whether the officers are entitled to qualified immunity as to their seizure of and use of deadly force on Duncklee. As we have said, the qualified immunity analysis has two prongs: (1) whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff establish that a constitutional right of his was violated; and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. We may consider these two prongs in either order, Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234 , 129 S.Ct. 808 .

We shall begin with the second prong: was it “clearly established” under the undisputed facts of this case that Defendants should not have used deadly force on Duncklee? These facts, as summarized in declarations made by Meyer and Soeder, are that upon opening the bedroom door with guns drawn, Duncklee immediately advanced towards the officers, yelling or growling, with a two-foot length of broken hockey stick raised in a threatening manner. The apartment was small and cluttered, making it difficult for the officers to retreat. Before firing, Officer Meyer yelled “police, stop” at Duncklee.

We conclude that reasonable officers in Defendants’ positions would not have known that shooting Duncklee violated a clearly established right. Indeed, the case law makes clear that the use of deadly force can be acceptable in such a situation. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11-12 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (“[I]f the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon ..., deadly force may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been given.”); Blanford v. Sacramento Cty., 406 F.3d 1110 , 1111-13, 1117-19 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that deputies were entitled to qualified immunity for shooting a suspect wandering around a neighborhood with a raised sword, making growling noises, and ignoring commands to drop the weapon). Thus, even assuming that a constitutional violation occurred, the district court erred by denying Defendants qualified immunity from this claim.

IV. CONCLUSION

The district court erred in denying qualified immunity to Defendants for their entry into the apartment and use of force on Duncklee. Moreover, because Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs claim arising out of their entry into the apartment, the district court erred by granting partial summary judgment for Plaintiff as to that claim.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

. At oral argument, upon questioning, Plaintiff’s counsel similarly answered that the facts were "largely undisputed.” Later, counsel did state that, "I believe the final confrontation— there are disputable facts about exactly what happened.” However, counsel noted no factual disputes and subsequently acknowledged that there is no contradictory evidence in the record. Likewise, we have found no evidence that counters the statements of Defendants. . The district court stated that the facts presented were those available to Soeder' and Meyer at the time of their encounter with Duncklee, as those are the facts relevant to whether the seizures violated Duncklee’s Fourth Amendment rights. All footnotes in the quotation are original to it, but are renumbered for use in this opinion. . Officer Soeder testified in his deposition that he believed he could hear the music from outside the apartment. In his affidavit, he stated that they did not hear the "faint” radio until he was in the apartment. . Hours after the shooting, TPD officials interviewed both Officers Meyer and Soeder. Officer Meyer stated in his interview that Mr. Duncldee was approaching him "faster than a walk slower than a run a brisk um ... uh a, hard to describe brisk walk um, not a run not a slow walk but he’s advancing towards me um, I would say in an aggressive manner with a scream.” (Doc. 33-1 at 201.) . As stated, the district court also accepted Plaintiff's argument that the case involved "a landlord-tenant dispute, a matter governed by civil and not criminal laws.” ERO 19, In light of Watts’ formal eviction and acceptance thereof, we disagree. Under any view of the facts, the case involved a criminal trespass. See, e.g., ER060 (April 25, 2014 Civil Minute Entry authorizing the order of eviction and noting, that once served with the order, an individual who returns to the property without permission commits criminal trespass in the third degree).