22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4f5,MEMORANDUM Nevada state prisoner William Shropshire appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendant Fajota illegally removed funds from his inmate trust account. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm. The district court properly granted summary judgment because Shropshire failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Ross v. Blake, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858-60 , 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (setting forth circumstances when administrative remedies are unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 , 126 S.Ct. 2378 , 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[Pjroper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits). (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.24:T522,

MEMORANDUM

Nevada state prisoner William Shropshire appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that defendant Fajota illegally removed funds from his inmate trust account. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Shropshire failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Ross v. Blake, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1858-60 , 195 L.Ed.2d 117 (2016) (setting forth circumstances when administrative remedies are unavailable); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90 , 126 S.Ct. 2378 , 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[Pjroper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits). (citation, internal quotation marks, and emphasis omitted)).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.