(concurring and dissenting):

I concur in the memorandum affirming the order of the Board of Immigration Appeals, as far as it goes. I dissent because it does not go far enough.

There is no merit whatever in the aliens’ motion to reopen, and there was no merit in it before the Supreme Court decided Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mendoza, 1984, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 3479 , 82 L.Ed.2d 778 , on July 5, 1984.

The aliens appeared, with counsel, on March 14, 1983, admitted deportability, and were granted the privilege of voluntary departure on or before May 11, 1983. Their present counsel, William D. McCann, filed a motion to reopen. In it, he alleged that the aliens’ home had been entered by Immigration and Naturalization agents and evidence had been seized from them. He also alleged that the agents did not have a warrant. He did not allege that the aliens did not consent to the entry or search. He did not allege what evidence was found or seized. He did not allege that any evidence found was used against the aliens. The only affidavit filed was one by attorney McCann. In it, he repeats what he says in his motion, on information and belief.

This was, on its face, a totally insufficient showing. It does not raise any issue, much less the issue described by the majority — i.e., “that evidence seized in violation of the aliens’ fourth amendment rights should have been suppressed at the deportation hearing.” No such evidence was presented or received at the hearing. The only evidence was the defendants’ own admissions.

The regulations, 8 C.F.R. 242.22 and 8 C.F.R. 103.5, require that the motion to reopen “shall state the new facts to be proved at the reopened proceeding and shall be supported by affidavit or other evidentiary material.” An affidavit by counsel, on information and belief, is not “evidentiary material” of any kind. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Wang, 1981, 450 U.S. 139, 143 , 101 S.Ct. 1027, 1030 , 67 L.Ed.2d 123 .

8 C.F.R. 242.22 also provides:

Obviously, these requirements have not been met, nor could they be.

The motion was denied, on April 29,1983. The immigration judge relied on Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Wang, supra, and on the fact that the aliens themselves, represented by counsel, admitted the facts showing that they were deporta-ble.

Moreover, at oral argument here, the following colloquy occurred as shown by our taped recording:

It is simply incontrovertible that the motion to reopen and the petition for review are meritless, and were filed solely for delay. As we said in In re Campos, 9 Cir., 1984, 737 F.2d 824 , “This court will not tolerate appeals filed for the purpose of delay.” The majority’s disposition states: “The circumstances of this case cannot be equated to those in In re Campos . . . .” Not so. The only material “circumstance” or fact in this case, so far as imposition of sanctions is concerned, is that the motion to reopen and petition for review are frivolous and obviously — indeed, admittedly — taken for delay. That was also the case in Campos . The majority’s view is an open invitation to counsel in immigration deportation cases to file meritless motions to reopen and meritless petitions for review, for purposes of delay. They will surely get the delay, as attorney McCann did here — approximately two and one-half years. And if counsel happens to draw the “right” panel, there will be no sanctions.

In Campos , we issued an order to show cause why Campos should not be disciplined. At the least, if the administration of justice in this court is to be even handed, we should issue a similar order to show cause as to McCann. I would go further. On the face of the record, it is clear that we should now impose upon McCann the same sanctions that we imposed upon Campos. That is what I would do. I dissent because we are not doing it.