MEMORANDUM

Juan M. Bribiesca, M.D., C.C.P, appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment in his action alleging federal claims arising from his state court proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Bribiesca’s action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Bribiesca’s action is a “de facto appeal” of a prior state court judgment, in which he raises issues that are “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 782 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that plaintiffs claim for conspiracy in the state court proceeding was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s decision); Henrichs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609 , 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because alleged legal injuries arose from the “state court’s purportedly erroneous judgment” and the relief sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”). Contrary to Bribiesca’s contention, the extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because Bribiesca did not allege facts showing that any adverse party prevented him from presenting his claims in state court. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply if extrinsic fraud prevented a party from presenting his claim in state court).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 , 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.